The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

151. Mr Blair and Mr Hoon were concerned about the impact of the air campaign

and the need to minimise casualties.

152. Mr Blair and Mr Hoon were told that the campaign would depend on “immediate

effect” rather than “weight of effort”.43

153. Mr Blair was concerned about the scale of the bombing campaign on Baghdad

and the risk of collateral damage and civilian casualties.44 The briefing acknowledged

that the intensity of the campaign “raised difficult issues over political control of the

targeting process”.

154. The PJHQ record noted that, “interestingly”, it was Mr Hoon who had urged

Mr Blair “to exercise a degree of restraint” on President Bush, whom Mr Hoon had

“described as ‘going for it’”.45 Mr Hoon was concerned to ensure that there was no

“irreversible damage” to Iraq.

155. Mr Blair and Mr Hoon were also concerned that “destruction of Iraq’s

communications infrastructure could reduce the speed at which the population

assimilated the hopelessness of resistance, and that hard-core elements could fight

on autonomously”.46 The Coalition would “need to consider how news of the regime’s

collapse would flow quickly through the country”.

156. Mr Blair was concerned to ensure that bombing targets were proportionate and

chosen to minimise civilian casualties, and asked to see a list of targets which UK air

forces might be asked to attack, with a commentary on their military importance and risk

of casualties.47

157. Forwarding that request to Mr Lee, Mr Watkins added a requirement to provide a

list of targets “which would be attacked by [US] aircraft operating from Diego Garcia (or

other UK airfields) or with other UK support”.48

158. The guidance on targeting subsequently agreed by the Government after

discussions with Lord Goldsmith is addressed later in this Section.

159. Mr Blair asked for further work on post-conflict issues.

43 Minute MA/DCJO(Ops) to MA/CJO, ‘Briefing to Prime Minister’ attaching Briefing [unattributed and

undated], ‘Brief to PM – 1715 Wed 15 Jan 03’.

44 Minute SECCOS to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 22 January 2003, ‘Record of the Meeting Between

the Prime Minister and Chiefs of Staff to Discuss Op TELIC: 15 Jan 03’.

45 Minute MA/DCJO(Ops) to MA/CJO, 15 Jan 2003, ‘Briefing to the Prime Minister’.

46 Minute SECCOS to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 22 January 2003, ‘Record of the Meeting Between

the Prime Minister and Chiefs of Staff to Discuss Op TELIC: 15 Jan 03’.

47 Letter Rycroft to Watkins, 15 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Planning’.

48 Minute Watkins to DG Op Pol, 16 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Planning’.

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