The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
814.
The details in
the letter are addressed in Sections 4.3 and 6.2.
815.
Mr Blair
held a meeting with senior Ministers to discuss Iraq before
Cabinet
on 30
January, but there is no official record of what was discussed or
the
conclusions
reached.
816.
Iraq was
discussed with Mr Prescott, Mr Straw, Mr Hoon and
Adm Boyce
in a meeting
before Cabinet.
817.
Mr Campbell
wrote that:
•
Mr Straw
had told Mr Blair several times that he had to make clear
[to
President Bush]
that the UK could not go ahead without a resolution.
•
Mr Straw
was also concerned about Lord Goldsmith’s reaction to
some
of the
proposed targets for the air campaign, “because he would feel
that
disproportionate
force was being applied”.
•
Adm Boyce
had “warned that he was worried the Americans felt they
would
be seen
as liberators. It just wasn’t so. They would be
resented.”
•
Mr Blair
was “clear that he wanted” to get President Bush to a second
resolution;
and he had
“got the message that we couldn’t do without one”.
•
Mr Blair
felt that “two or three Blix reports, and more time for Arab
leaders
to push
Saddam out” were needed.
•
Mr Hoon
was “worried”; Mr Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of
Defense,
was saying
“that the problem with the UN route was that it was
open‑ended,
that other
countries just used the process so nothing ever
happened”.268
818.
There is no
No.10 record of the discussion.
819.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet on 30 January that he would be discussing
the
policy on
Iraq with President Bush the following day. Saddam Hussein
was
not co‑operating
fully and while the inspectors would need time to
reach
a firm conclusion,
that period could not be open‑ended.
820.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet on 30 January that he would be discussing the policy
on
Iraq with
President Bush the following day.269
The United
Nations inspectors “needed
to be given
clear direction following their report” to the Security Council on
27 January.
Saddam
Hussein was “not co‑operating fully but the pressure on him to do
so was
increasing.
It would take time for the inspectors to come to a firm conclusion,
but that
period
could not be open‑ended.”
268
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
269
Cabinet
Conclusions, 30 January 2003.
150