12.1  |  Security Sector Reform

to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) by April. Over 70 percent of Police Stations in

Basra province have already reached this level. This is up markedly from a starting

average TRA level of 3.3 (out of 4) in September 2006.

“However, for all the efforts made, levels of trust in the police force remain low, and

some assessments indicate that the IPS continue to do more to undermine rather

than guarantee security.”

1338.  On the Iraqi Army, the paper stated that the main issue was the “quality of its

leadership, in addition to unwillingness to stand up to militia activity and a lack of

equipment”. To address concerns about 10th Division’s capabilities and readiness, a

“dedicated” SSR team of four MiTTs would be deployed, each comprising five or six

people, to carry out training at divisional and brigade level.

1339.  The paper noted that closing bases in the city would make any military

re‑intervention high‑risk. In the event of re‑intervention, all training of the ISF would

have to cease until the operation was complete. Post‑PIC plans for SSR depended on

a degree of freedom of movement in and around Basra, including a military and civilian

presence at the PJCC.

1340.  Mr Browne visited Iraq from 28 to 31 January (described in Section 9.5).1235 In a

report of the visit, an Assistant Private Secretary reported that Mr Browne was told that:

• The leadership of Basra security structures was inadequate (a point

which he in turn raised with Prime Minister Maliki and Mr Abdel Qadir, Iraqi

Defence Minister).

• The US was not convinced about Basra being ready for transition or the

capability of the 10th Division.

• The Police Adviser felt the police were less effective than six months before

“principally because of intimidation rather than any lack of training or capability”.

1341.  Mr Browne’s Assistant Private Secretary commented that those views seemed

to contradict the messages that had previously been received on the success of

Op SINBAD. There was “a lack of firm indicators to substantiate or refute” the different

conclusions.

1342.  In his update to DOP on 1 February, Mr Browne reported on his visit to Iraq.1236

In Basra he had “seen first hand the positive effect that Operation SINBAD had had”;

the reported murder rate had reduced and “sectarian violence had almost stopped”.

Continued violence was mainly directed against coalition forces.

1235  Minute McNeil to MA1/DCDS(C), 1 February 2006 [sic], ‘Defence Secretary’s Visit to Iraq –

28‑31 January 2007’.

1236  Minutes, 1 February 2007, DOP meeting.

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