6.3 |
Military equipment (pre-conflict)
268.
On
29 November, a DCRS official provided a UOR update for
Ministers, the
Chiefs of
Staff and various other senior personnel, recording that 35 UORs
and
162 USURs
had been approved.131
Those
included desert clothing, AS90 environmental
enhancements,
Challenger 2 dust mitigation and enhanced armour protection,
battlefield
ambulance
upgrades and field hospital upgrades.
269.
The combined
cost of the 35 UORs was £115m, against the initial £150m
allocated
by the
Treasury.
270.
The same day,
the DCRS official sought permission from Mr Hoon for the
MOD
to commence
discussions with industry on the procurement of desert clothing,
ECBA,
water and
fuel distribution and medical equipment.132
The
official explained that,
although
Mr Hoon had already given that permission on
13 November:
“… there is
a perception in other areas (including the DLO) that restrictions
on
consulting
industry remain in place and the uncertainty needs to be
removed.”
271.
The areas
where “some concern had been expressed” included the build-up
of
sustainability
commodities related to land forces and COLPRO.
272.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Office replied on 2 December, agreeing that the MOD
could
discuss
“any items of equipment relating to operations in Iraq” with
industry “at the
appropriate
stage in the UOR process”.133
That was
“on the understanding that
appropriate
confidentiality will be observed”.
273.
In December
2002, the MOD and the Treasury agreed how the MOD
would
claim the
cost of military operations against Iraq from the
Reserve.
274.
On
28 November, Mr Hoon wrote to Mr Brown to request an
increase in the UOR
ceiling
from £150m to £300m and to secure agreement that the MOD should
begin to
capture all
non-UOR additional costs, with a view to repayment from the Reserve
in due
course.134
He stated
that the current UOR process was “working well”.
275.
Mr Blair
agreed on 9 December that the MOD should plan on the basis
that a
political
decision to commit land forces could be taken as early as
15 February 2003
(see
Section 6.1).
276.
A copy of the
letter recording Mr Blair’s decision was sent to Mr Mark
Bowman,
Mr Brown’s
Private Secretary.
131
Minute DCRS
1 to APS/SofS [MOD], 29 November 2002, ‘Possible Operations
Against Iraq UOR List,
29 November
2002’.
132
Minute DCRS
1 to APS/SofS [MOD], 29 November 2002, ‘Potential Operations
in Iraq: Requirement
to Discuss
Equipment Procurement with Industry’.
133
Minute
APS/SofS [MOD] to DCRS 1, 2 December 2002, ‘Potential
Operations in Iraq: Requirement
to Discuss
Equipment Procurement with Industry’.
134
Letter Hoon
to Brown, 28 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Urgent Operational
Requirements’.
41