1.1 | UK Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000

448. Mr Alastair Campbell, Mr Blair’s Director of Communications and Strategy, wrote

in his diary on 2 February:

“Iraq was the main focus with the French and Russians trying to get a diplomatic

solution, but TB was pretty clear where it was heading.”181

449. The Butler Report stated that the JIC concluded on 4 February that:

“UNSCOM and the IAEA have succeeded in destroying or controlling the vast

majority of Saddam Hussein’s 1991 weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

programme.”182

450. On the same date, Mr Campbell recorded: “We turned the factual briefing into

a paper for the media showing the extent of Saddam’s capability and the damage

he could do.”183

451. During Defence Questions on 9 February, Mr George Robertson, the Defence

Secretary, told the House of Commons that he was making available new information

on Iraq’s chemical weapons capability at the time of the Gulf War, concerning “recently

received intelligence that Iraq may have possessed large quantities of a chemical

weapons agent known as Agent 15 since the 1980s”.184 Mr Robertson described Agent

15 as “a mental incapacitant”.

452. Mr Campbell recorded that Mr Blair chaired the first meeting of the Iraq media

management group on 16 February, and was “alarmed at how poor the FCO/MOD

propaganda effort was”.185

453. On 19 February, Mr Campbell recorded that Cabinet was “mainly Iraq and Ireland”,

and that Mr Blair said “it was not an option to do nothing. We either got the inspectors in

or we had to take action.” Mr Blair was concerned that “Saddam would pitch a response

perfectly to Kofi … to get the French and Russians into a different position to the rest of

us.” That concern was also discussed in a call with President Bill Clinton on 22 February.

454. On 20 February, the Security Council adopted resolution 1153 (1998) which

increased the size of the Oil-for-Food programme, “to avoid any further deterioration

of the current humanitarian situation”.186

455. On 23 February, Mr Annan obtained an undertaking from the Iraqi Government

to resume co-operation. In an MOU signed by Mr Annan and Mr Aziz, the Government

of Iraq reconfirmed “its acceptance of all relevant resolutions of the Security Council”

181 Campbell A & Stott R. The Blair Years: Extracts from the Alastair Campbell Diaries. Hutchinson, 2007.

182 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,

page 45.

183 Campbell A & Stott R. The Blair Years: Extracts from the Alastair Campbell Diaries. Hutchinson, 2007.

184 House of Commons, Official Report, 9 February 1998, column 11.

185 Campbell A & Stott R. The Blair Years: Extracts from the Alastair Campbell Diaries. Hutchinson, 2007.

186 UN Security Council resolution 1153 (1998).

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