The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
programmes
posed a threat to peace and endorsed a strategy of
engaging
closely
with the US Government in order to shape policy and its
presentation.
•
At
Crawford, Mr Blair offered President Bush a partnership in
dealing urgently
with the
threat posed by Saddam Hussein. He proposed that the UK and
US
should
pursue a strategy based on an ultimatum calling on Iraq to permit
the
return of
weapons inspectors or face the consequences.
•
Following
his meeting with President Bush, Mr Blair stated that Saddam
Hussein
had to be
confronted and brought back into compliance with the
UN.
•
The
acceptance of the possibility that the UK might participate in a
military
invasion of
Iraq was a profound change in UK thinking. Although no decisions
had
been taken,
that became the basis for contingency planning in the months
ahead.
801.
The following
key findings are from Section 3.3:
•
By July
2002, the UK Government had concluded that President
Bush
was
impatient to move on Iraq and that the US might take military
action
in circumstances
that would be difficult for the UK.
•
Mr Blair’s
Note to President Bush of 28 July sought to persuade President
Bush
to use the
UN to build a coalition for action by seeking a partnership with
the US
and setting
out a framework for action.
•
Mr Blair
told President Bush that the UN was the simplest way to encapsulate
a
“casus
belli” in some defining way, with an ultimatum to Iraq once
military forces
started to
build up in October. That might be backed by a UN
resolution.
•
Mr Blair’s
Note, which had not been discussed or agreed with his
colleagues,
set the UK
on a path leading to diplomatic activity in the UN and the
possibility
of participation
in military action in a way that would make it very difficult for
the
UK
subsequently to withdraw its support for the US.
2002
802.
The following
key findings are from Section 3.4:
•
In
discussions with the US over the summer of 2002, Mr Blair and
Mr Straw
sought to
persuade the US Administration to secure multilateral support
before
taking
action on Iraq; and to do so through the UN. They proposed a
strategy
in which
the first objective was to offer Iraq the opportunity and last
chance to
comply with
its obligations to disarm.
•
If Iraq did
not take that opportunity and military action was required, the UK
was
seeking to
establish conditions whereby such action would command
multilateral
support and
be taken with the authority of the Security Council.
112