3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
694.
Asked about
the rationale for focusing on Iraq first, Sir David responded that
he
thought
there were a number of reasons. One was:
“… that the
Americans were determined to focus on it. We weren’t given a
choice
… In the
international system, whether it wanted to have a good look at Iraq
at this
point or
not, it really had no option because Bush was going to do this
…
“The
question was therefore how far you could get inside the argument
and try and
shape it
and shape what happened, and I think that’s where the Prime
Minister was
in April.
They are going to do something. We have to try and be in a position
to affect
the
policy.
“He
believed … that given his own relationship with Bush, he probably
had a good
chance of
doing that. So therefore he was determined to have that
discussion,
though … he
didn’t need any persuading that Iraq was a problem … he felt
Iraq
was a
serious destabilising influence in the system, but I don’t want to
pretend that
it would
have been his top priority at this stage if it hadn’t been one of
Bush’s top
priorities
… it wouldn’t …”263
695.
Asked whether
Mr Blair was more forward leaning about getting rid of
Saddam
Hussein
than his principal advisers, including Sir David himself, Sir David
responded
that, in
terms of Mr Blair’s position as a very prominent actor on the
international stage:
“Iraq fits
into a pattern … interventionism in the Balkans … Kosovo … Sierra
Leone
…
Afghanistan, he’s very much an activist … much more inclined to
push and take
the bold
action than probably other members of his Cabinet.”264
696.
Asked if Mr
Blair would have listened to a contrary opinion if one had been
“argued
powerfully”
at the Chequers meeting, Sir David told the Inquiry that Mr Blair
would have
listened
but:
“… he was
somebody who was very comfortable with his own convictions
…
believed he
had a capacity to influence the international system in quite
profound
ways, had a
quite a lot of success doing this … he had a sense that he
could
actually
act for the good, he could change things, and that this was
absolutely a role
that he
felt he could command.”265
“I don’t
want to suggest he’s not open to argument … He was absolutely up
for
argument
and didn’t hold it against you. But I think this is part of a deep
conviction
that there
are moments when you can change things, you’ve got to have
the
courage to
do it, and he was up for that.”266
263
Private
hearing, 24 June 2010, page 31.
264
Private
hearing, 24 June 2010, pages 32-33.
265
Private
hearing, 24 June 2010, pages 32-33.
266
Private
hearing, 24 June 2010, page 33.
515