The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

505.  Shortly after publication, Secretary Gates was asked at a news briefing whether

he accepted that there was a civil war in Iraq.269 He replied:

“… I believe that there are essentially four wars going on in Iraq.

“One is Shia on Shia, principally in the South; the second is sectarian conflict,

principally in Baghdad, but not solely; third is the insurgency; and fourth is Al Qaida,

and Al Qaida is attacking, at times, all of those targets.”

506.  Mr Browne visited Iraq from 28 to 31 January.270 In a report of the visit, an Assistant

Private Secretary described continued differences between UK plans and US views on

MND(SE) in a note to MOD Ministers and officials:

“A new US team is in no mood to take risks and re‑evaluates across the board,

expressing concerns in the South over 10 Div, Iranian influence and UK ability

to apply its military muscle in Basra City after re‑posturing. In response the new

MND(SE) command team begin to look at re‑posturing within US tolerances,

which might lead to an extended presence in Basra Palace and less of a dividend

at roulement.

“But the broad strategy can and should survive. Both re‑posturing and some

drawdown should proceed. Above all there is a need to see the wider context –

US politics is driving the numbers up just as we feel ours can come down. Basra

is still not Baghdad. Nevertheless the resulting tension is manifesting itself in the

recently expressed operational concerns of US commanders. MiTTs and PTTs

[Military Transition Teams and Police Transition Teams] are a key element in the

US argument. The criteria for transition have always had a measure of interpretation

in them, and the US are rapidly re‑interpreting to fit the context in which they have

to operate.”

507.  Concluding his report, the Assistant Private Secretary wrote:

“For this visit the net effect was, at first sight, an alarming and unforeseen change in

military advice over re‑posturing, which has implications beyond Iraq. It suggested

that we had either failed to foresee the scale of this US change of approach and its

implications, or that perhaps our previous plan was lacking in some areas. There are

bound to be a host of nuances that soften this rather stark conclusion but they were

drowned out by the ‘shock of the new’.”

508.  The Assistant Private Secretary recorded that Lt Gen Lamb had “confirmed a clear

and widespread apprehension at the highest levels of the US military about our plans

for Basra”.

269  US Department of Defense, 2 February 2007, ‘DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Gen.

Pace from Pentagon’.

270  Minute McNeil to MA1/DCDS(C), 1 February 2006 [sic], ‘Defence Secretary’s Visit to Iraq –

28‑31 January 2007’.

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