The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Battle
casualties
Casualties
from chemical warfare
Casualties
from biological warfare
Disease and
Non-battle Injuries
Medical
evacuations
Expected
number of
157-241
152-212
15 percent
of those exposed
34 a
day
55 a
week
Actual
number of
admissions
81
0
0
31 a
day
90 a
week
53.
In July, PJHQ
assessed that medical support during Op TELIC had been “a
success
by any
measure”.29
The
aeromedical evacuation of casualties (by VC 10 to Cyprus
then
by civilian
aircraft to the UK) had been particularly effective.
54.
PJHQ reported
that some evacuated Service Personnel were nursed in
NHS
hospitals
without other military patients and had therefore lacked “peer
support”.
55.
The issue of
treating injured Service Personnel in NHS hospitals, and on
civilian
wards,
would come to prominence in 2006.
56.
Lt Gen
Lillywhite told the Inquiry that in the early part of Op TELIC, the
MOD did
not have
the data to make an objective assessment of the effectiveness of
emergency
care.30
Analysis of
data relating to later phases of Op TELIC indicated that UK
medical
support was
achieving a significantly greater than expected survival
rate.
57.
Gen O’Donoghue
told the Inquiry that the DMS drew two major lessons from
its
experience
during the invasion:
•
It needed
more Regular medical Personnel, to take account of the limited
time
that any
individual could spend in theatre given their NHS commitments and
the
need to
retain “medical dexterity”.
•
UORs
allowed DMS to respond to particular threats and secure the
latest
equipment,
but it needed more equipment and supplies “on the shelves”
ready
58.
Lt Gen
Lillywhite described a number of changes in the provision of
medical care
after Op
TELIC 1.32
During Op
TELIC 1, the MOD generally used armoured ambulances
to move
casualties from aid posts to medical regiments and a mixture of
ambulances
and
helicopters to get from (Role 2) medical regiments to hospital.
From Op TELIC 2,
the
military generally used helicopters to move from the point of
wounding or the aid
post to
hospital.
28 As
defined in the 1 September 2002 Strategic Medical Estimate. Figures
for battle casualties and
casualties
from chemical warfare represent best and worse case estimates
respectively.
29
Report
PJHQ, July 2003, ‘Operation TELIC 1 – Medical Post Operation
Report’.
30
Public
hearing, 20 July 2010, pages 14-16.
31
Public
hearing, 14 July 2010, pages 16-17.
32
Public
hearing, 20 July 2010, pages 22-23.
48