The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Iraq’s Weapons
of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment, published by
the International
Institute
for Strategic Studies (IISS) on 9 September.145
461.
In his
speech to the TUC on 10 September, Mr Blair argued that the
threat
posed by
Iraq was not imminent but it had to be dealt with before it
could
“erupt and
engulf us all”.
462.
As he had
planned in his minute of 30 August, Mr Blair set out the
rationale for
tackling
the problem of Iraq – “why I say Saddam is a threat that has to be
dealt with” –
in the
first section of his speech to the TUC on 10
September.146
463.
In the speech,
Mr Blair elaborated many of the points he had made in his
press
conference
on 3 September. Mr Blair argued that Saddam Hussein’s actions
in starting
wars of
aggression, using chemical weapons against his own people and
oppressing
them made
his regime:
“With the
Taliban gone … unrivalled as the world’s worst regime
…
“Given that
history … to allow him to use the weapons he has or to get
the
weapons he
wants would be an act of gross irresponsibility and we should
not
countenance it.”
464.
Mr Blair
stated that “when the weapons inspectors were evicted from Iraq in
1998
there were
still enough chemical and biological weapons remaining to devastate
the
entire Gulf
region”. He also stated that Saddam Hussein had a nuclear
programme,
which he
had denied and which had been “disrupted” by inspections. He was in
breach
of “23
outstanding UN obligations requiring him to admit inspectors and
disarm”.
465.
Containment
had worked “up to a point”, but sanctions were eroding and
Saddam
Hussein was
getting around US$3bn a year through illicit trade which he was
“almost
certainly”
using for his weapons programmes. British and American pilots were
risking
their lives
to police the No‑Fly Zones; and that couldn’t “go on for
ever”.
466.
Addressing the
way ahead, Mr Blair stated that it was right to deal with Iraq
through
the UN; it
was the will of the UN that Saddam was flouting. The challenge for
“all in the
UN” was “to
resolve the threat from Saddam not avoid it”. Mr Blair
added:
“Let it be
clear that he must be disarmed. Let it be clear that there can be
no more
conditions,
no more games, no more prevaricating, no more undermining of the
UN’s
authority.
“Let it be
clear that should the will of the UN be ignored, action will
follow. Diplomacy
is vital.
But when dealing with dictators … diplomacy has to be backed by the
certain
145
IISS
Dossier, 9 September 2002, Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment.
146
The
Guardian, 10
September 2002, Full text
of Tony Blair’s TUC address.
172