6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
743.
On 23 October,
at the FCO’s request, the JIC assessed the likely reaction of
the
Kurdish and
Shia population of Iraq to any US-led attack.375
It
evaluated how significant
and unified
the two groups were, their links to Iraq’s neighbours and the
external Iraqi
opposition,
and their aspirations and fears for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. The
JIC
assessed
that “each population is a complex web of different groups and
interests”.
UK knowledge
of the Shia inside Iraq was “very limited”. Senior religious
leaders had
“some
influence over the Shia population”, but the JIC could not gauge
its extent.
744.
The JIC
assessed that Iraqi Shia contact with the outside world was
“limited and
ad hoc”,
and judged that:
“...
currently
neither Iran nor the external opposition has a significant
influence
over the Shia
population as a whole. On the
contrary, we believe many Iraqi Shia
fear Iran
winning influence over the future of Iraq because of Tehran’s
supposed
insistence
on the centrality of Sharia in political life.”
745.
The JIC’s
conclusions included the assessment that:
“…
spontaneous
uprisings, without any
clear central leadership, are likely in
both
southern and northern Iraq … should the regime’s control collapse
quickly.
Army
deserters (the Shia form the bulk of the Iraqi military’s conscript
force)
could join
these in large numbers. The pace of events in such a
scenario could
overtake
any planning by the KDP and PUK in the north, and in the
south
control
could devolve by default to a patchwork collection of tribal
leaders
and religious
figures about whom we
know little. In both areas there could be
violent
score settling …”
746.
The JIC
assessment was not reflected in the Cabinet Office paper of 1
November
on models
for Iraq after Saddam Hussein.376
747.
At the
beginning of November, the Cabinet Office sent No.10 a paper
on
models for
Iraq after Saddam Hussein. It is not clear whether it was seen
by
Mr Blair.
748.
The paper
was to be the steering brief for the UK delegation to the first
round
of
UK/US/Australia talks on post-conflict issues in Washington on 6
November.
375
JIC
Assessment, 23 October 2002, ‘Iraq: The Kurds and
Shia’.
376
Minute
Drummond to Manning, 1 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Post-Saddam’ attaching
Paper ‘Iraq: Models
and some
questions for post-Saddam government’.
237