9.3 | July 2004 to May 2005

• to deliver results to the Sunni Arabs, including incorporating “experienced

Ba’athists (ex or otherwise)”;

• to continue to develop IECI capability to help it deliver the constitutional

referendum and the elections in December 2005;

• either to invest significant additional resources in Security Sector Reform or to

plan on the basis of a significant MNF-I presence in Iraq in 2006 or beyond; and

• to develop an effective relationship with the transitional government, while

recognising that it would owe its appointment to the TNA, which would be

“likely to reduce the ability of the US/UK and MNF-I to influence the policies of

the ITG to the extent we have with the IIG”.

399. Mr Blair visited Baghdad on 21 December, where he commented to journalists:

“I tell you exactly what I felt coming in. Security is really heavy – you can feel the

sense of danger that people live in here … coming from terrorists and insurgents …

Now where do we stand in that fight? We stand on the side of the democrats against

the terrorists.” 210

400. The No.10 report of his visit recorded that “Iraqiisation and political outreach were

key themes”.211

401. Mr Blair met Prime Minister Allawi and had been encouraged that he was working

on a security strategy which he intended to publish shortly.

402. On reconstruction, Mr Blair was “very concerned about the slow pace of …

spending, especially in the South” and wanted the UK to make a major effort to secure

greater funding.

403. During the visit, Interior Minister Naqib confirmed to Sir Nigel Sheinwald that the

IIG would facilitate forced returns of Iraqis without immigration status in the UK to Iraq.212

Prime Minister Allawi indicated that a Memorandum of Understanding should be signed

as soon as possible.

404. The JIC reviewed election prospects on 23 December.213

405. It judged that the planned election date would stick, despite previous pressure

for a delay. The likely extent of Sunni Arab participation in the election was unclear,

although it was expected that many would be deterred by the security situation and

some by a perception that the process was unfair or lacked legitimacy. In addition:

210 BBC News, 21 December 2004, Blair’s statement in Baghdad.

211 Letter Quarrey to Owen, 23 December 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to Iraq: Follow-Up’.

212 Letter Quarrey to Adams, 21 December 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to Baghdad, 21 December:

Meeting with Allawi’.

213 JIC Assessment, 23 December 2004, ‘Iraq: Election Prospects’.

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