The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
262.
Mr Blair
added that the best source of leverage over Prime Minister Maliki
was his
desire for
the UK not to leave “precipitately”. He concluded that “we should
therefore
offer him a
timetable, conditional on his securing an acceptable political
compact, to
which
Muqtada al‑Sadr had signed up”.
263.
ACM Stirrup
updated the meeting on “the continued good progress in
Operation
SINBAD” and
noted that:
“… once it
had concluded, we would have done as much as we judged
militarily
possible in
Basra. He noted, however, that it did not deal with the
fundamental
problem of
militias. The Prime Minister queried whether it could therefore
be
effective.
CDS [ACM Stirrup] suggested that the militia problem would have
to
be dealt
with politically.”
264.
On 9 November,
Sir Nigel Sheinwald sent a Note from Mr Blair to President
Bush
“Our
foreign policy is so joined, we both face the same issues. So a
Democrat
victory is
seen here as a ‘thumping’ for me as well as you!”
“… my worry
is: waiting for Baker’s group to come up with a strategy. We
should
lead the
consensus not simply follow it. Our danger is either being seen for
political
reasons, to
‘cave in’, which we will never do; or have to be told the answer
because
we can’t
think of it. Actually our strategy is already evolving. Before
Baker reports we
should
spell out that evolution.”
267.
Mr Blair
explained that strategy for Iraq should include:
•
a political
compact to be published by the Iraqis, committing to
non‑sectarian
government
and ruling out partition of the country, with support from both
Sunnis
and Muqtada
al‑Sadr;
•
a plan for
better governance;
•
accelerating
the plan to complete the formation of the army and police;
and
•
a
conditional timescale for withdrawal, focused on Iraqi capability
and “making
no
concessions on democracy”.
154
Letter
Sheinwald to Hadley, 9 November 2006, ‘Iraq and the Middle East’
attaching Note Blair,
9 November
2006, ‘Note’.
52