13.1 | Resources

revised paper incorporated her comments on an earlier draft. On funding, in place of the

statement above, the paper stated:

“A large‑scale regional response … would certainly test the already stretched human

resource and monetary capacity of many agencies and donors.”

194. Mr Fernie’s minute was copied to the Private Office of Mr Suma Chakrabarti,

DFID Permanent Secretary.

195. Ms Short agreed that the paper could be shared with the US, subject to the

inclusion of an explicit reference to DFID’s lack of financial resources to cover the

humanitarian contingencies considered in the paper.127

196. Ms Short held a meeting with DFID officials on 18 November to discuss Iraq.128

Ms Anna Bewes, Ms Short’s Private Secretary, recorded that the meeting had agreed

that it would be important to cost each military option, including both military and

“realistic humanitarian” costs. Ms Short was concerned that not only was no money set

aside for humanitarian activity, but the issue was not even being considered.

197. Mr Fernie set out his understanding of Ms Short’s concern in an email to DFID

colleagues the following week:

“… HMT [the Treasury] have been talking to MOD only about the military

costs without taking into account the costs to the international community of

any humanitarian response, post‑Saddam transitional administration and/or

reconstruction … The SoS [Ms Short] is particularly keen to make clear that DFID

cannot find substantial funds for any such work from our existing budgets.”

“We [DFID] are trying to cobble together some figures of possible costs – all a

bit speculative … but the point at this stage is to get others in Whitehall thinking

about it.”129

198. On 3 December, Mr Fernie reported to Dr Nicola Brewer, DFID Director General

Regional Programmes, that there had been no progress in interesting the Cabinet Office

or the Treasury in costing “various scenarios”.130 Mr Jim Drummond, Assistant Head

(Foreign Affairs) of the Cabinet Office Overseas and Defence Secretariat (OD Sec), and

the AHGI had both given a “clearly negative response”. The “Cabinet Office line” was

that if DFID thought it would incur unaffordable extra costs, it should bid to the Treasury.

Mr Dodds had expressed some concern over international burden‑sharing, but had

shown “little interest” in Ms Short’s concerns and had thought that there would be “no

appetite” in the Treasury for producing “Whitehall‑wide” costings. DFID’s Conflict and

127 Manuscript comment Short, 4 November 2002, on Minute Fernie to Private Secretary/Secretary of State

[DFID], 4 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Contingency Planning: Humanitarian Paper’.

128 Minute Bewes to Miller, 19 November 2002, ‘Iraq’.

129 Email Fernie to Sparkhall, 26 November 2002, ‘Iraq – Expenditure Implications across Whitehall’.

130 Minute Fernie to Brewer, 3 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Contingency Planning’.

475