9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
•
The UK was
continuing outreach efforts with both Sunni and Shia
groups,
“seeking to
draw in as many potential strands of opinion as
possible
to reduce
the military task in tackling the hard core insurgency” and
trying
to persuade
the US to deliver a “dividend” for
those who enter the political
process.
•
The UK
(primarily DFID) was providing support to a number of
governmental
structures,
but this effort was “dwarfed by
a very large … often overambitious
US
programme” (see Section
10.2).
24.
On Basra, the
paper reported that officials had been undertaking a “major review
of
policy” in
MND(SE), following concern (shared by the US) that Basra was not on
track
to meet the
proposed transition timelines; that the ability of UK personnel to
operate
effectively
in MND(SE) was seriously constrained by the deteriorating security
situation;
and that
the UK had not done enough to ensure that its legacy in Basra would
be a
strong
contribution to delivering stability and increasing prosperity (see
Section 9.4).
25.
The work to
address those issues was split into four strands:
•
political
engagement with the Iraqi Government in Baghdad, with local
politicians
in MND(SE)
and with Muqtada al‑Sadr; plus efforts by the PRT to
support
provincial
councils’ capacity to deliver quick wins;
•
a revised
Basra Security Plan, including plans to increase the capacity of
the
police
(through increased mentoring, and the reform of the specialist
crime units
– see
Section 12.1) and improved intelligence on the situation in
Basra;
•
strengthening
the rule of law and governance structures, including
securing
funding for
improved criminal justice facilities (including from US and
EU
sources);
and
•
further
economic development and reconstruction, in particular
through
helping
Basra to access central government resources and a variety of
both
short‑term
and longer‑term local environmental and infrastructure
projects
(see Section 10.2).
26.
An annex to
the paper described the key elements of the Basra Security
Plan.
Its purpose
was defined as:
“… to
remove the immunity and impunity that Governor of Basra’s
patronage
provides to
assassination squads, target the rogue Jaysh al‑Mahdi (JAM)
leadership,
and target
and reform corrupt police agencies.”
27.
The objective
of the operation was:
“Civil
Authority successfully restored, an increasingly capable ISF in the
lead
and
continuing to prosecute operations through a combination of
reassurance,
deterrence
and attrition of insurgents, leading to Provincial Iraqi
Control.”
7