12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
coalition
forces do not know the backgrounds of the tribes. It is a job of
the [Iraqi]
1182.
In his
evidence to the Inquiry, Mr Asquith recalled:
“From the
second half of 2006 and certainly through 2007, the American
attitude
moved … to
engage some Sunni Arab tribes in the Sunni Arab provinces to throw
off
the
militias and Al Qaida groups that were positioned there, and to
engage in local
cease‑fires,
with the aim, in time, of those local cease‑fires spreading more
broadly
1183.
In an email to
the FCO on 14 June 2007, Mr Asquith wrote that Mr Blair
and ACM
Stirrup had
requested further advice from Baghdad on coalition support for the
Anbar
“… I do not
doubt the tactical benefit of engaging those in Anbar and other
Sunni
areas in
which AQ operate with the purpose of persuading them to turn
against
AQ. Nor do
I have any reason to doubt MNF‑I assessments that this
engagement
has
delivered significant results in terms of identifying AQ operatives
and caches,
restricting
AQ operating capabilities and reducing attacks … against coalition
forces.
Engaging
with local armed, militant, insurgency or opposition groups was of
course
what I and
others were engaged in throughout 2005. I am not opposed to
the
principle.”
1184.
Nevertheless,
Mr Asquith questioned whether those groups had turned
against
AQ for
wholly ideological reasons. He thought the groups were more
strongly motivated
by a power
struggle with AQ, which was encroaching on the tribes’ territory,
by money
or by a
desire – under the protection of US forces – to rearm and prepare
for a future
campaign
against Iran and/or the “Shia government”.
1185.
Mr Asquith
considered that that had had an adverse effect on the
Coalition’s
broader
reconciliation strategy. It increased Prime Minister Maliki’s
concerns and put
him “under
severe pressure from his Shia constituency who pose the question:
why is
he
tolerating the creation of what effectively are Sunni militias who
pose a threat (now
or later)
to Shia communities, while at the same time tolerating regular
coalition attacks
on Shia
militias?”
1186.
Mr Asquith
acknowledged:
“Given the
imperative for [Gen] Petraeus to deliver something by 13 September
…
we can’t
halt the engagement process. We should instead seek to shape it in
a way
that
reduces the risk.”
1110
Newsweek,
15 June
2007, CFR: What
are Iraq’s Benchmarks?
1111 Public
hearing, 4 December 2009, page 16.
1112
Email
Asquith to Casey, 14 June 2007, ‘Anbar Engagement’.
331