The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
[a Russian
resolution] off than to salvage a negotiation of our own that was
launched
before the
ground had been properly prepared.”
317.
The FCO letter
was sent to Sir David Manning; no copy addresses were
identified.
318.
Mr Straw’s
meeting with Mr Blair on 5 September is addressed later in
this Section.
319.
In a
conversation with Secretary Powell on 6 September, Mr Straw
said that the UK
would not
want a kitchen sink resolution which was
un‑negotiable.104
He was sure
that
Mr Blair
would reinforce that message with President Bush.
320.
Sir David
Manning advised Mr Blair that there would be better prospects
of
securing a
tough mandate if there was a promise to return to the Security
Council
before
force was used.
321.
Sir David
Manning and Dr Rice discussed the contents and handling of a
draft
resolution
in the morning of 6 September.105
322.
Sir David
reported to Mr Blair that he had told
Dr Rice:
•
A
resolution “must not be a transparent device to justify military
action. The focus
must be the
return of Inspectors, and WMD. If Bush tabled something that
could
not easily
be dismissed as a transparent pretext for immediate military
action,
there would
be a wide measure of international support.”
•
That “did
not mean that the resolution should not be tough on Saddam. But
it
would need
nice judgement and strong nerves to get the balance right …
Once
the
international community had signed up, we would be in a different
place.”
•
“The
Russians would be key. It was essential that Bush did a great deal
of heavy
lifting
with Putin before the resolution was tabled …”
•
“France
would also be crucial to the argument.” Mr Blair was talking
to President
Chirac that
day.
•
Sir David
“thought that the French would rally to a well constructed, even if
tough
resolution,
as long as they believed the US purpose in tabling it was
genuine”.
•
A
resolution was needed that “made it clear this was Saddam’s last
chance. But
the
question of an ultimatum would need great care. It might be worth
adopting
a strategy
in two parts: an initial resolution that stipulated strict
conditions with
the
implication that further action would follow swiftly if these were
not met.
Thereafter,
if Saddam failed to fulfil the conditions, we would need a
second
resolution
containing an ultimatum. Countries that had supported the
first
resolution
would find it correspondingly harder to oppose the second …
these
104
Minute
Davies to Gray, 6 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.
105
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 6 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation
with Dr Rice’.
150