12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
983.
Although the
two papers were broadly the same, Mr Tansley suggested that
the
dismissal
of IPS officers would require the implementation of a planned MOI
redundancy
package
whereas Maj Gen Dutton saw that as desirable but not
essential. Mr Tansley
also
suggested that a suitably qualified senior civil servant should be
deployed to assist
MOI
reform.
984.
Both papers
suggested that the numbers of military personnel dedicated
to
support
police reform should be increased (to include an extra two infantry
companies,
RMP
personnel and administrative staff) and that restrictions on
movement of police
officers
and contractors should be eased to allow them to move with the
military.
985.
Mr Tansley
suggested that there should be joint responsibility for delivery
between
the Senior
Police Adviser and the Task Force Commander in each province,
with
ArmorGroup
personnel directly managed by the Senior Police Adviser.
Maj Gen Dutton’s
paper did
not suggest a formal command structure but did cite “lack of unity
of
command” as
a major part of the problem.
986.
Lt
Gen Dutton told the Inquiry that there was “nothing
particularly magical” about
the
three‑point plan:
“It was a
very simple plan, but it was designed in some ways to counter what
I
thought was
a feeling from elsewhere, that the only answer to the Basra police
force
was to
disband it completely and start again from
scratch.”915
987.
On 27 October,
Dr Reid reported to Cabinet that the build‑up of Iraqi
security
forces was
“going well” but that they “were generally not yet capable of
operating on
their
own”.916
He stated
that he and Mr Straw were looking at ways of addressing
militia
infiltration
in the Iraqi police.
988.
On 31 October,
the MOD produced a paper about the UK’s policy on the
IPS
to be
considered at the next DOP(I).917
The paper
outlined the approach advocated
by
Mr Tansley and Maj Gen Dutton but proposed that all
police reform in MND(SE)
should be
consolidated “under unified military direction … enabling the GOC
to deploy
additional
(civil and military) resources as necessary”. The MOD
stated:
“… the
utility of the civil police contingent … is limited by their
contractual terms
of service
and civilian working practices … If they were brought under
military
direction
(the command and control issues would need to be finessed) the
policing
component
would be employed to meet the priorities of operational transition,
with
its output
reported through the established military chain.”
915
Public
hearing, 12 July 2010, page 20.
916
Cabinet
Conclusions, 27 October 2005.
917
Paper MOD,
31 October 2005, ‘Iraq – UK Policy for Police Security Sector
Reform (SSR)’.
281