6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
•
“Saddam has
not lost control or the capacity for rational tactical
decisions.
He
continues to maintain regime cohesion, primarily through
intimidation. He is
unlikely to
agree to relinquish power or to go into exile. He still believes he
has
a chance of
averting military action or, once military action begins, forcing
the
Coalition
to cease hostilities before his regime collapses.”
•
“Once
military action has begun, widespread lack of loyalty to the regime
will
become
clear. Iraqis may not welcome Coalition Forces, but most will at
least
acquiesce
in Coalition military activity to topple the regime, as long as
civilian
casualties
are limited. A hard fought professional defence of Baghdad is
unlikely,
although
elite military and security elements closely identified with the
regime
may fight
until their positions become untenable.”
•
“Saddam
probably believes he has some strong political and military cards
to
play, even
in the face of an inevitable attack … He may use human
shields,
fire CBW
against Coalition Forces, launch a pre-emptive attack on the
Kurds,
Coalition
Forces building up in Kuwait or Israel, or sabotage Iraqi oil wells
and
water
supply.”
313.
The Assessment
stated that: “Given the high level of uncertainty over
Saddam’s
response
once he recognises his survival is at stake, we will need to plan
for a wide
range of
humanitarian crises, including a possible humanitarian role for
Coalition Forces.”
314.
The Assessment
also stated:
•
Iraqis
believed that the West was “squeamish about casualties”. The
JIC
continued
to judge that Iraq’s capability to conduct terrorist attacks was
“limited,
especially
outside the Gulf region”.
•
The JIC had
“previously judged that terrorism could be attempted
against
Coalition
Forces during a military build-up if Saddam believed that an
attack
was
inevitable”. There had been “no indication that Iraq was behind the
recent
attack on
US contractors working for the US military in Kuwait”. That
had,
however,
highlighted “the vulnerability of the large numbers of Coalition
Forces
concentrated
in an area as small as Kuwait”.
•
Iraq might
well “seek to use its influence over some smaller militant
Palestinian
groups to
encourage them to strike at US and Coalition interests in the
Middle
East in the
event of a Coalition attack”. There were “also uncorroborated
reports
of Iraq
assembling teams in various countries to attack UK and US interests
in
the event
of war against Iraq”.
•
“Despite
the presence of terrorists in Iraq with links to Al Qaida”, there
was
“no
intelligence of current co-operation between Iraq and Al
Qaida”.
•
There had
been “no clear indication of any plan for a pre-emptive military
strike
against the
Kurds, neighbouring countries or Israel”. Saddam would have
“little
incentive
to launch such a strike while the Iraqi strategy focuses on
convincing
UNMOVIC
that Iraq does not have WMD holdings”, but it might
“become
431