The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
485.
Mr Straw
also stated that a majority of members of the Security Council
had
been
opposed to the suggestion that resolution 1441 should state
explicitly that
military
action could be taken only if there were a second
resolution.
486.
In his
evidence to the FAC on 4 March, Mr Straw was asked a series of
questions
by
Mr Donald Anderson, the Chairman of the Committee, about the
legality of military
action
without a second resolution.198
487.
Asked about
Mr Blair’s “escape clause” and that the Government “would
not
feel bound
to await” a second resolution “or to abide by it if it were to be
vetoed
unreasonably”,
Mr Straw replied:
“The reason
why we have drawn a parallel with Kosovo is … it was not possible
to
get a
direct Security Council resolution and instead the Government and
those that
participated
in the action had to fall back on previous … resolutions and
general
international
law … to justify the action that was taken … We are satisfied that
we
have
sufficient legal authority in 1441 back to the originating
resolution 660 [1990] …
to justify
military action against Iraq if they are in further material
breach.”
488.
Mr Straw
added that that was “clearly laid down and it was anticipated when
we
put 1441
together”. The Government would “much prefer” military action, if
that proved
necessary,
“to be backed by a second resolution”, but it had had to reserve
its options if
such a
second resolution did not prove possible. That was what
Mr Blair had “spelt out”.
489.
Asked if the
Government should proceed without the express authority of the
UN,
Mr Straw
replied:
“We believe
there is express authority … There was a … a very intensive
debate
– about
whether … 1441 should say explicitly … that military action to
enforce
this
resolution could only be taken if there were a second resolution.
That … was
not
acceptable to a majority of members of the Security Council, it was
never put
before the
… Council. Instead … what the Council has to do … is to consider
the
situation …”
490.
Mr Straw
told Sir Patrick Cormack (Conservative) that Iraq had “been in
material
breach as a
matter of fact for some weeks now because they were told they had
to
co‑operate
immediately, unconditionally and actively”. He added:
“… we are
anxious to gain a political consensus, if that can be achieved …
which
recognises
the state of Iraq’s flagrant violation of its obligations. As far
as …
the British
Government is concerned, that is a matter of fact; the facts speak
for
198
Minutes, 4
March 2003, Foreign Affairs Committee (House of Commons), [Evidence
Session],
Q 147-151.
199
Minutes, 4
March 2003, Foreign Affairs Committee (House of Commons), [Evidence
Session], Q 154.
88