The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
The Inquiry
has seen papers that indicate a review of the ‘Joint Targeting and
Battle
Damage
Assessment’ policy paper was carried out in late April 2003, with
the aim of
highlighting
any differences between the theory of targeting and the realities
of an
operation.103
Two main
issues were identified: the ability to provide accurate and
timely
BDAs and
the difficulty in target clearance where UK strategic aims did not
agree totally
with US
strategic aims.
In his
post-operation tour report, Major General Peter Wall, Chief of
Staff to AM Burridge
during the
invasion and subsequently Commander 1 (UK) Div, wrote:
“The
conduct and co-ordination of BDA was poorly done throughout the
operation.
BDA
analysis from MEF [the US Marine Expeditionary Force] was at best 5
days too
late.
Immediate BDA from pilots gave a general idea but was, invariably,
inaccurate.
This meant
that targets were re-engaged unnecessarily on many occasions,
denying
In its
report of lessons from the conflict, the MOD Directorate of
Operational Capability
(DOC)
identified that the different models and methods used by the US and
UK to
estimate
collateral damage had resulted in a divergence of policy which had
produced
friction.105
It
concluded that the UK needed to develop its policy to seek greater
coherence
with the
policies of potential allies, particularly the US. It also
recommended that improved
tools were
required for the assessment of collateral damage to enable rapid
decisions;
and that
compatibility with US systems should be a consideration. The
Coalition BDA
process had
not been able to cope with the scale of the task and the UK’s
capacity
needed to
be reviewed to ensure it matched the needs of a national operation.
In addition,
it was
based on damage not effect. That too should be reviewed for
compatibility with the
concept of
effects-based targeting.
Asked if
there were any areas of improvement he would suggest, ACM Torpy
told the Inquiry:
“The only
area which I think we could have done more with, and that is
the
mechanisms
by which we assessed collateral damage. One of my roles I
saw
was making
sure that our targeting process was aligned as closely as
possible
with the US
system, but where there were inevitably going to be differences,
that
I sorted
those out with Gen Moseley before the campaign started, and we
tried
to find a
mechanism for solving those problems. One of the issues was if the
US
use a
particular software system for working out collateral damage and we
use a
different
one that it comes out with slightly different answers. Ours is
slightly more
conservative.
I think more work in trying to align some of that methodology
would
155.
AM Burridge
described the UK mine countermeasures group as the
“backbone”
of the
Coalition’s mine clearance capability.107
103
Minute MOD
[junior official], 23 April 2003, ‘Review of the Joint Targeting
and Battle Damage
Assessment
Policy Paper’.
104
Report
Wall, 6 October 2003, ‘Post Operation Report – Version 2 Operation
TELIC’.
105
Report
Directorate of Operational Capability [MOD], 17 October 2003,
‘Operation TELIC
Lessons Study’.
106
Public
hearing, 18 January 2011, page 13.
107
Report
Burridge to CJO, 8 May 2003, ‘NCC Operation TELIC Hauldown
Report’.
28