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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
The Inquiry has seen papers that indicate a review of the ‘Joint Targeting and Battle
Damage Assessment’ policy paper was carried out in late April 2003, with the aim of
highlighting any differences between the theory of targeting and the realities of an
operation.103 Two main issues were identified: the ability to provide accurate and timely
BDAs and the difficulty in target clearance where UK strategic aims did not agree totally
with US strategic aims.
In his post-operation tour report, Major General Peter Wall, Chief of Staff to AM Burridge
during the invasion and subsequently Commander 1 (UK) Div, wrote:
“The conduct and co-ordination of BDA was poorly done throughout the operation.
BDA analysis from MEF [the US Marine Expeditionary Force] was at best 5 days too
late. Immediate BDA from pilots gave a general idea but was, invariably, inaccurate.
This meant that targets were re-engaged unnecessarily on many occasions, denying
assets elsewhere.” 104
In its report of lessons from the conflict, the MOD Directorate of Operational Capability
(DOC) identified that the different models and methods used by the US and UK to
estimate collateral damage had resulted in a divergence of policy which had produced
friction.105 It concluded that the UK needed to develop its policy to seek greater coherence
with the policies of potential allies, particularly the US. It also recommended that improved
tools were required for the assessment of collateral damage to enable rapid decisions;
and that compatibility with US systems should be a consideration. The Coalition BDA
process had not been able to cope with the scale of the task and the UK’s capacity
needed to be reviewed to ensure it matched the needs of a national operation. In addition,
it was based on damage not effect. That too should be reviewed for compatibility with the
concept of effects-based targeting.
Asked if there were any areas of improvement he would suggest, ACM Torpy told the Inquiry:
“The only area which I think we could have done more with, and that is the
mechanisms by which we assessed collateral damage. One of my roles I saw
was making sure that our targeting process was aligned as closely as possible
with the US system, but where there were inevitably going to be differences, that
I sorted those out with Gen Moseley before the campaign started, and we tried
to find a mechanism for solving those problems. One of the issues was if the US
use a particular software system for working out collateral damage and we use a
different one that it comes out with slightly different answers. Ours is slightly more
conservative. I think more work in trying to align some of that methodology would
have been helpful.” 106
The maritime campaign
155.  AM Burridge described the UK mine countermeasures group as the “backbone”
of the Coalition’s mine clearance capability.107
103  Minute MOD [junior official], 23 April 2003, ‘Review of the Joint Targeting and Battle Damage
Assessment Policy Paper’.
104  Report Wall, 6 October 2003, ‘Post Operation Report – Version 2 Operation TELIC’.
105  Report Directorate of Operational Capability [MOD], 17 October 2003, ‘Operation TELIC
Lessons Study’.
106  Public hearing, 18 January 2011, page 13.
107  Report Burridge to CJO, 8 May 2003, ‘NCC Operation TELIC Hauldown Report’.
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