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10.2  |  Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
be supported by surge capacity from Dhi Qar and Basra (and eventually
just Basra).
453.  The IPU described this as the “4-2-1” model, as four PRTs reduced to two (Basra
and Dhi Qar) and then one (Basra) over time.
454.  The IPU advised that the US would need to agree the UK model, which might
require Ministerial-level discussions with US counterparts.
455.  At the meeting, Mr Straw said that the IPU paper “proposed that we went along
with the United States’ proposal but without disrupting our own plans for military
transition”.260 Dr Reid agreed that the UK response should be positive, but stressed the
need to keep control of and tailor developing PRT plans in the provinces where the UK
was directly involved.
456.  DOP(I) agreed the paper.261
457.  Officials revisited the decision to adopt a 4-2-1 model in January 2006.
458.  Mr Straw wrote to Mr Benn at the end of November, reporting that the Deputy
Governor of Basra and members of the Basra Provincial Council had pressed for more
visible UK development projects, and had drawn attention to a number of DFID projects
that had recently been closed.262
459.  Mr Straw understood that those projects had been funded from the employment
generation component of the southern Iraq Employment and Services Programme
(SIESP), which DFID had closed down in August 2005. Mr Straw recognised the security
constraints and the need to ensure funds were properly used, but asked that DFID
officials look for some way to respond to the Councillors’ request for “highly visible,
‘flagship’ projects”.
460.  Mr Benn replied on 9 December, highlighting the work DFID was doing in Basra
and with the Provincial Council.263 He did not offer new proposals and cautioned that
DFID had to be “extremely careful” about publicising reconstruction projects, in case
such publicity made workers and projects more attractive targets for insurgents.
461.  The Iraqi elections took place on 15 December.264 Mr Patey reported that the day
had passed off peacefully with no major security events.
260  Minutes, 1 December 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
261  Minutes, 1 December 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
262  Letter Straw to Benn, 28 November 2005, ‘Basra Development Projects: My Meeting with Basra
Provincial Council, 11 November’.
263  Letter Benn to Straw, 9 December 2005, ‘Basra Development Projects: Your Meeting with Basra
Provincial Council, 11 November’.
264  eGram 20961/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 16 December 2005, ‘Iraq: Elections: Election Day’.
273
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