The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1122.
The DoD
reported to Congress on 2 March that over 40 Joint Security
Stations
in Baghdad
would be established to “facilitate co‑operation between coalition
and Iraqi
Forces and
to build trust and confidence with the local
population”.1057
1123.
The Report to
Congress stated that the generation of MNSTC‑I‑agreed
force
levels as
mandated under the Petraeus Plan was considered complete. Both the
IMOD
and the MOI
had assumed control of most force generation tasks.
1124.
A letter from
Mr Browne, circulated to DOP(I) members ahead of a meeting
on
10 May,
commented that “we must build on examples like Anbar, once
considered all but
lost, where
tribal leaders are now working with the coalition to drive out Al
Qaida”.1058
1125.
Mr Browne
said in discussion at the DOP(I) meeting that, in Anbar: “young
Sunnis
were
queuing up to join the Iraqi Security Forces”.1059
Mr Gordon
Brown took office as Prime Minister of the UK on 27 June 2007. In
his initial
Cabinet
reshuffle, he appointed Mr David Miliband as Foreign Secretary
and Mr Douglas
Alexander
as Development Secretary. Mr Des Browne remained as Defence
Secretary
until 3
October 2008.
Mr Brown
reorganised the structure of Cabinet Committees. As well as
discussions
in Cabinet,
Iraq business was formally addressed in the Overseas and
Defence
Sub‑Committee
of the Committee on National Security, International Relations
and
Defence
(NSID(OD)). An additional sub‑committee specifically on Iraq
(NSID(IR)) was
also
established, but never met.
1126.
In June, a
proposal agreed by Prime Minister Maliki established an
additional
light
infantry division, bringing the total planned force structure to
131060
divisions.1061
That
expansion was funded by the Iraqi Government, bringing the total
IMOD expansion
budget to
US$950m. The development of the 14th Division which was to be
raised in
Basra is
described further in Box, ‘A new Iraqi Army division for Basra’,
later in
this Section.
1127.
Commenting in
his valedictory on 16 August 2007, Mr Asquith
said:
“The surge
has failed to create the space for politics to work because the
military
(tactical)
successes (local security structures loyal to the MNF) conflict
directly with
the
political objective (inclusive and integrated national Iraqi
authority).”1062
1057
Report to
Congress, 2 March 2007, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
1058
Letter
Browne to Blair, 5 May 2007, ‘Iraq: Reconciliation’.
1059
Minutes, 10
May 2007, DOP(I) meeting.
1060
The new
division would be called the 14th Division, because the number
13 was not used.
1061
Report to
Congress, 14 September 2007, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
1062
Letter
Asquith to Miliband, 16 August 2007, ‘Iraq:
Valedictory’.
318