The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Saddam Hussein
to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. That is what I
believe,
and that
is the assessment of the Joint Intelligence Committee – and frankly
I
prefer its
assessment to the assessment of the Iraqi regime, which, let us
say,
on the basis
of experience, is not one that should carry a lot of
credibility.”
821.
Mr William
Hague (Conservative) asked:
“Does the
Prime Minister recollect that, in the half-century history of
various states
acquiring
nuclear capabilities, in almost every case – from the Soviet Union
in 1949
to Pakistan
in 1998 – their ability to do so had been greatly underestimated
and
understated
by intelligence sources at the time? Estimates today of Iraq
taking
several
years to acquire a nuclear device should be seen in that context …
[I]s there
not at
least a significant risk of the utter catastrophe of Iraq
possessing a nuclear
device
without warning, some time in the next couple of years? In that
case, does
not the
risk of leaving the regime on its course today far outweigh the
risk of taking
action
quite soon?”
“I entirely
agree … For the preparation of the dossier we had a real concern
not to
exaggerate
the intelligence that we had received. For obvious reasons, it is
difficult
to reflect
the credibility of the information, and we rate the credibility of
what we have
very
highly. I say no more than that.
…
“… I
entirely agree that the danger of inaction … far outweighs the
danger of action.”
823.
Other points
made by Mr Blair included:
•
“… [I]n my
judgement, if we do not deal with the proliferation of
weapons
of mass
destruction and their retention by highly unstable states, often
with
dictatorial
regimes, then perhaps not this year or next, but in the not too
distant
future,
that problem will explode on to the consciousness of the world. I
believe
that
passionately, which is why, whatever the issues in relation to Iraq
… it is
important
to take a stand now and say that, when we have made
determinations
on behalf
of the international community, we will see them through. If we do
not,
the message
to Saddam and anyone else will be that they can develop
these
weapons
with impunity and that the international community lacks the will
to deal
with
them.”
•
“… [T]he
point is that if we know that someone has weapons of
mass
destruction,
if they have used them before and if, as a result, the
international
community
has said they must be disarmed of those weapons, surely
the
greatest
risk is letting them carry on developing those weapons and not
doing
anything
about it.”
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