The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
began to
harass and kill Dawa members. Mr Ja’afari served as the Dawa
spokesman
in London.
After
returning to Iraq in 2003, Mr Maliki became the Dawa Party
spokesperson, and
represented
the party on the United Iraqi Alliance’s political
committee.296
535.
Mr Straw
reported the election of President Talabani to Cabinet on 7 April
and
observed
that it would be important to generate momentum for the new
government,
and to
ensure “people understood how much progress had been
made”.297
536.
Mr Straw and
Mr Hoon agreed that Iraq was moving towards a position
where
a drawdown
of British troops could, in time, be possible.
537.
In April 2005,
an FCO delegation led by Mr Asquith had initial discussions
with
a group
judged to have influence on the political leadership of the Sunni
insurgency.298
Mr Asquith’s
report of the discussions concluded that:
“This was a
worthwhile exercise … They were appreciative of the opportunity
…
However,
the opposition remains incoherent … Sunni distrust of the Shia
political
leadership
of the ITG is matched by exasperation with US forces whose
practices
are
strengthening support for rejectionists. The Sunni opposition
leadership look
on us
as the only honest broker around with the necessary influence on
the relevant
parties. I
made clear … that we were not in the business of imposing
outcomes
and that
this was an Iraqi affair, for Iraqis themselves to sort
out.
“We need to
encourage their political networking efforts, giving due weight to
the
established
Sunni political leadership. Left to themselves, the Iraqi parties
will not
sort this
out … We need to push the parties together, while avoiding
appearing to
interfere
in the democratic process. Discretion is key.”
538.
Mr Asquith
recommended that the UK should continue its contacts with this
and
similar
groups and press the US and Iraqi Government to make a similar
effort.
539.
In a meeting
with Sir Nigel Sheinwald on 13 April, Mr Paul Wolfowitz, US
Deputy
Secretary
of Defense, warned that there was a danger of losing the
momentum
generated
by the January elections.299
In his
view, “Iraq was going in the right direction,
but not
fast enough”. Sir Nigel agreed.
296
Briefing
DIS [junior official], 24 April 2006, ‘Pen Picture – Jawad
al-Maliki (aka Nouri Kamel and
Abu Isra)’.
297
Cabinet
Conclusions, 7 April 2005.
298
Minute
Asquith to Sawers, 8 April 2005, ‘Iraq: Developing a Dialogue with
Those Close to the
Iraqi
Insurgency’.
299
Letter
Phillipson to Adams, 16 April 2005, ‘Nigel Sheinwald’s Meetings in
Washington, 13 April:
Middle East
Issues’.
480