The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“What had
been interesting was that Bush listened far more intently to TB. TB
did
not make
too much of his own problems, and was stressing he thought we
were
doing the
right thing.”17
49.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported that Dr Blix was prepared to work with the
UK
on
identifying tests “as long as the bar was not out of reach of a
complying Iraq”.
50.
Dr Blix
had reminded Sir Jeremy that UNMOVIC still lacked clear evidence
that
Iraq
possessed any weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
51.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock met Dr Blix late on 9 March to explore whether the
various
ideas for
an ultimatum combined with specific tests for Iraq could be made
part of a new
52.
Sir Jeremy
told Dr Blix that the “risk of failure on our current draft
was high enough
for another
way forward to be contemplated”. The UK might now be prepared “to
set
Saddam a
series of tests, with dates set for him to meet specific
requirements. If he
failed at
any stage, the final opportunity would be lost”. It would be
important to devise
tests that
set the bar high, and not to lower them “in the face of Iraqi
bluster”. The UK
needed a
professional judgement from Dr Blix on which areas should be
set as tests.
53.
Sir Jeremy
reported that Dr Blix was prepared to work with the UK on a
series of
tests over
timed periods “as long as the bar was not out of reach of a
complying Iraq”;
and that he
had assured Dr Blix that that was not the UK’s objective. The
US still had
to be
persuaded, “but that was our job”.
54.
Dr Blix
had also reminded Sir Jeremy “that UNMOVIC still lacked clear
evidence
that Iraq
possessed any WMD at all”.
55.
Following
discussion of the details, Sir Jeremy commented that:
“… subject
to further thoughts from UNMOVIC … a convincing test by, say 21
March
would
comprise:
•
Interviews
[outside Iraq], accepting UNMOVIC’s lower number, with a venue
of
either
Larnaca or Bahrain, and adding a warning about
intimidation.
•
RPVs and
spray tanks [for possible delivery of chemical or biological
agent]:
full documentation
and explanations.
•
Completion
of the Al Samoud destruction (since they are obviously
keeping
some for a
conflict).
•
A
convincing public statement by Saddam.”
56.
The FCO
suggested some changes to the tests identified by
No.10.
17
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
18
Telegram
391 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 10 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Second
Resolution’.
410