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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
“Debates about political accommodation inevitably prompted the question of what
strategic success in Iraq might now look like. Or to use the current mantra, what
does ‘Iraq good enough’ actually mean? Given that the US and UK arguably began
this war for different strategic reasons, the imperative to agree some common
ground for the campaign’s endstate becomes yet more pressing. I sense it is the
Iraqis who will determine what ‘good enough’ means for them and it may well be far
short of our previous definitions of strategic success. I believe the time is ripe to
re‑open the debate with theatre and Washington on this fundamental issue.”311
600.  Mr Blair’s Private Secretary put a draft Parliamentary statement on developments
in Iraq into Mr Blair’s red box for consideration over the weekend of 17 and
18 February.312
601.  In an accompanying note, Mr Jonathan Powell advised Mr Blair:
“This is a major opportunity to change the way people think about the situation in
Iraq and the way forward … you need to give people the sense of an overall plan
and a way forward that could lead to success … The key question you have to
answer is whether it is inevitable that Iraq will sink into a vicious civil war that will
only end with the partition of the country and the success of Iran.”313
602.  On 18 February, Sir Nigel Sheinwald wrote a minute for Mr Blair describing two
conversations with Mr Hadley over that weekend.314 Sir Nigel explained that President
Bush supported the timing of the UK’s announcement, but had asked that Mr Blair make
clear that “re‑posturing in Basra is the result of success, not an attempt to hedge against
failure” and that substantial numbers would remain, with a continued training role.
603.  In his weekly report on 18 February, Lt Gen Lamb wrote that Operation Fardh
al‑Qanoon was picking up momentum.315 Gen Petraeus had ensured work on
infrastructure and basic services had been placed into a new and higher gearing.
Although the number of attacks in Baghdad remained broadly undiminished, the mood
music on the street suggested small, but positive, indicators of change.
604.  On 19 February, Mr John Howard, the Australian Prime Minister, committed to
sending 70 additional military instructors to Iraq.316
311  Minute CGS to CDS, 19 February 2007, ‘CGS visit to Iraq: 14‑15 Feb 07’.
312  Minute Banner to Prime Minister, 16 February 2007, ‘Iraq – Statement to the House’.
313  Minute Powell to Prime Minister, 16 February 2007, ‘Iraq Statement’.
314  Minute Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 18 February 2007, ‘Iraq and Israel/Palestine: White House views’.
315  Minute Lamb to CDS, 18 February 2007, ‘SBMR‑I Weekly Report (245) 18 Feb 07’.
316  www.theage.com.au, 19 February 2007, ‘70 non‑combat troops for Iraq’.
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