The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

437.  Three days later, FCO officials recommended to Mr Jack Straw, the Foreign

Secretary, “a safe and measured return to road moves” for civilian staff in the

South “in order to fully promote HMG objectives”.230 They proposed that, subject to

regular review:

• all civilian staff be allowed to travel in Warrior vehicles within Basra, where there

was a significant risk from armour piercing roadside bombs;

• UK civilian police officers be able to travel with contracted British Iraqi Police

Advisers in their FCO armoured vehicles, escorted by UK military Snatch Land

Rovers; and

• road moves in FCO armoured vehicles should restart along the main road from

Basra Airport to Nasiriyah and Basra Airport to Kuwait.

438.  Mr Straw approved the recommendations on 9 January 2006, provided the rules

were subject to regular review.231

439.  In his post‑tour report on 18 January, Maj Gen Dutton recorded:

“The most significant threat in MND(SE) derives from Passive Infra‑red (PIR)

initiated EFP IED attacks on MNF patrols and civilian convoys … RCIEDs and

CWIEDs remain an extant threat … EFP IEDs […] were responsible for 18 fatalities

between Sept and Dec 05 …”232

440.  Maj Gen Dutton reported that the “new and more complex IEDs allowed Shia

militants to conduct increasingly lethal attacks and effectively fix MNF by an extended

low intensity terrorist operation. This achieves the intent … by separating MNF from the

Shia community and allowing local JAM to fill the security vacuum.”

441.  In explaining the lessons from his tour, Maj Gen Dutton wrote: “The over‑riding

operational imperative during this period has been the requirement to mitigate the

development and proliferation of PIR initiated IEDs.”

442.  Maj Gen Dutton stated that in some circumstances their effect had been

“particularly tangible” upon freedom of operation and had “resulted in significant

rebalancing of force structures” and “a rapid evolution and re‑examination” of TTPs.

That had led to decisions to prohibit any ground movements, other than by Warrior or

Challenger vehicles, inside the towns of al‑Amara and al‑Majir al‑Kabir in Maysan; and

subsequently, “stringent” Warrior‑led convoys into Basra City and “the satellite bases”.

SSR had been “significantly curtailed”.

230  Minute Iraq Directorate [junior official] to Foreign Secretary, 19 December 2005, ‘Iraq: Proposed

Changes to Travel in Southern Iraq for HMG Civilian Staff’.

231  Minute Siddiq to Iraq Directorate, 9 January 2006, ‘Iraq: Proposed Changes to Travel in Southern Iraq

for HMG Civilian Staff’.

232  Report HQ MND(SE), 18 January 2006, ‘Progress Report Operation TELIC’.

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