The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
166.
Summing up the
discussion, Mr Straw described the meeting’s agreement that
“the
UK should
retain a right of veto in extremis” on ORHA activities. It was
agreed that UK
support to
ORHA should be increased and formalised; Mr Straw would write to Mr
Blair
on this
point.
167.
Mr Blair spoke
to President Bush on the evening of 10 April and welcomed
the
fact that
the IIA would not be created until after the Iraq
conference.82
He
underlined the
importance
of “getting the presentation right”. Mr Blair also warmly welcomed
the NSC’s
plans to
create a “quantified baseline” of life in Iraq before the conflict
so that changes
made by the
Coalition would be visible.
168.
As described
in Section 6.5, the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) had
established
a Red Team
in February 2003 to provide the military Chiefs of Staff and
others
across
Whitehall with an independent view of current intelligence
assumptions and
169.
On 11 April,
the Red Team published a report assessing the prospects
for
governance
in Iraq after the end of hostilities. They considered that
“international
and
regional acceptance of the IIA” would be essential, as OFF
corruption scandals
had
discredited the UN within Iraq.84
But as a
result of returning waves of exiles with
experience
of Western politics, “it may be … that serious political debate
will commence
more
quickly than expected”.
170.
The Red Team
concluded that “the odds are probably even for the
emergence
of a
genuinely democratic society or one nominally so, but dominated by
the power of
patronage
and the military”.
171.
The Red Team
also stated that the current “lawlessness in the ‘liberated’
areas”
was:
“…
exacerbated by the disappearance of the civil police and
administration in some
towns,
residual fear of the ‘shadow’ regime and the possible emergence of
new
militias in
the face of apparent Coalition compliance.”
172.
The Red Team
judged that in the short term the “most pressing need” would
be
for
“Coalition forces to satisfy their legal obligations by restoring a
peaceful and secure
environment”.
In the medium term, they warned that there was “a real danger that
where
there is no
Coalition presence anarchy will result”.
173.
On 11 April,
Legal Advisers to the MOD, FCO and Attorney General had a
“helpful
interchange”
by video conference with their US and Australian
counterparts.85
82
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 10 April 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Conversation
with Bush, 10 April’.
83
Minute
PS/CDI to APS2/SofS [MOD], 25 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Red Teaming in
the DIS’.
84
Minute
PS/CDI to APS2/SofS [MOD], 11 April 2003, ‘Iraq Red Team – The
Future Governance of Iraq’
attaching
Paper ‘Iraq Red Team: The Future Governance of Iraq’.
85
Minute
[unattributed], [undated], ‘American Summary Points, Video Link:
Friday 11 April’.
158