The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
227.
There had been
“serious deficiencies” in the draft disclosure on biological
weapons
submitted
in November 1995 but Iraq had produced new documents and
disclosures
during
discussions in January 1996, including:
•
Al Hakam
had been intended to be a “specialised filling facility for
biological
warfare
munitions”.
•
R-400 bombs
for biological warfare purposes were assembled there.
•
Clarification
of several issues including “those related to destruction of
some
types of
biological warfare munitions”.
•
A “serious
attempt” had been made to “resolve the fundamental issue of
the
filling and
… destruction of biological warfare warheads for missiles”; but
it
had not
been possible to do so because “Iraq’s statements did not conform
to
documentation
available” to UNSCOM.
228.
Discussions in
February had been less productive. Changes were
introduced
“without
any documentary support or convincing explanations”. The view of
the
UNSCOM team
involved was that their Iraqi counterparts “tended to change
production
data to
accommodate newly discovered facts”.
229.
UNSCOM wanted
“a substantiated material balance … from production to
destruction”,
but the draft disclosure submitted in March did not match
UNSCOM’s
findings.
Unless Iraq could rectify that “in a convincing manner” in its
formal declaration,
it would
“cause great problems”.
230.
Iraq had
accepted an UNSCOM request to cease all activity at two sites
identified
with the
production of BW agents and assisted in establishing appropriate
deactivation
and
surveillance measures.
231.
Iraq had
provided a report on a radiological weapons project by the
Military
Industrial
Corporation and Iraq’s Atomic Energy Commission between August
and
December
1987, “to combine the effectiveness of conventional aerial
munitions with the
spreading
of radioactive materials”. Four prototypes had been constructed.
The report
had
concluded that Iraq “had the capability to manufacture a bomb
containing irradiated
materials”,
but the Iraqi Air Force suggested that there should be a study to
consider
reducing
the weight of the bomb.
232.
Iraq’s
declaration stated that:
•
The project
had been abandoned and no order to produce radiological
weapons
was
given.
•
100 empty
casings for a smaller calibre bomb had been produced.
•
75 of the
casings had been sent to the Al-Qa-Qa State Establishment, but
their
fate was
not addressed.
•
25 of those
casings which remained at al-Muthanna were unilaterally
destroyed
in the
summer of 1991.
64