1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
•
Normal –
which could be visited without restriction.
•
National
Security – where the modalities for inspections of sensitive sites
would
apply,
“except for the most secret rooms … to which no access would be
granted”.
Mr Aziz
had agreed to an improvement of the arrangements, including
that:
{{The size
of the inspection team would be proportionate to the size
and
complexity
of the site and agreed on a case-by-case basis.
{{Iraq
would take steps significantly to reduce the delay in
entry.
{{Immediately a
site was declared sensitive, the Chief Inspector and
an
Iraqi
minder could enter to ensure that movement was frozen and
that
documents
would not be burnt or destroyed.
•
Presidential
and sovereign – in relation to which Iraq’s “absolute” position
was
that
inspections and overflights would not be allowed “under any
circumstances”,
which
Mr Butler doubted would be acceptable to the Security
Council.
•
Civilian
sites/private residences – in which the Government had no
authority
and UNSCOM
would need the owner’s permission for inspections.
Mr Butler
expressed
reservations about Iraq’s position.
•
Foreign –
where UNSCOM would have to deal directly with the
owners.168
430.
Iraq asked
again whether the U-2 surveillance flights could be replaced by
Iraqi
assets or
those of another nation.
431.
Iraq continued
to state that it had “destroyed and/or no longer had any
weapons
of mass
destruction” and had proposed technical “seminars” to address
disagreement
on issues
of substance. Mr Aziz had stated “for the public record” that
the Government
of Iraq had
decided in 1991 to “deny and obliterate traces of its biological
weapons
programme”
on the grounds of “national security and survival”.
432.
Iraq had
declined UNSCOM’s invitation to develop an additional joint
work
programme,
but agreed to technical evaluation meetings on missile warheads and
VX
in January,
with a meeting on biological weapons to follow “as soon as
practicable”.
433.
The report
confirmed that, where facilities had been visited, dual-use
equipment
had been
returned and the Commission had found no evidence of proscribed
activities.
434.
In December
1997, the JIC noted that Iraq “may have retained hidden
production
equipment,
agent and delivery systems” and that it “could … regenerate a
significant
offensive
BW capability within months”.169
168
UN Security
Council, 17 December 1997, ‘Report on the visit to Baghdad
from 12 to 16 December
1997 by the
Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the
Secretary-General under
paragraph 9
(b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)’
(S/1997/987).
169
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
page
48.
101