The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“maximum
contribution … at the lower end of large scale … medium scale
(minus) for
maritime
(about 10 major warships), and medium scale for air (about 60 fast
jets)”.
91.
The force mix
might not be evenly balanced (in terms of scale of effort) across
the
sea, land
and air environments; but the UK would “always seek to achieve
strategic
influence
across the three environments such that UK influence is in place
throughout
the joint
environment”.
92.
Lt Gen
Pigott presented the findings from the SPG analysis to Mr Hoon
on 24 May.43
He advised
that “until there is greater visibility and clarity of US intent
our work on
potential
approaches to an Iraq campaign remains speculative; this work is
advancing
but will
lack definition until we engage with the US”.
93.
Three broad
options (“force packages”) had been identified, which were
“illustrative
of the
maximum potential … contribution” that the UK might be able to make
available
for any
offensive operations within given time periods:
a.
Three
months’ warning: Deployment
of medium scale joint force – 10 warships
including a
carrier, an armoured brigade, about 60 fast jets and associated
support.
That was
described as at risk of being a “token contribution”. The cost,
including
“essential”
UORs for equipping the force was estimated at £500m to
£800m.
b.
Six months’
warning: Deployment
of a large scale, war-fighting force in addition
to the
medium scale maritime and air components, which would be
“comparable
to the
1990/1991 conflict” and “confer significant influence on the
control of the
campaign”.
Though the land element would be “capable of limited
independent
war-fighting”,
there would be sustainability issues. Large numbers of
vehicles
could
become “unserviceable” and there would be reliance on others to
supply
ammunition
and other stock. There would not be enough time for “the
procurement
and fitting
of all
UOR
equipment considered to be essential for operations in
the
Gulf (such
as the desertisation of all armoured vehicles)”, which would
generate
further
operational risks and result in the degradation of the “credibility
of the UK’s
contribution
as [the] campaign unfolded”. That option would require the call out
of
5,000-10,000
Reservists and cost £800m to £1.1bn. A decision would need to
be
taken
immediately for operations to begin in December 2002.
c.
Nine
months’ warning: The force
package would be the same as (b) but would
be better
prepared and carry fewer risks, as a result of additional training
and
equipment.
The package would have “enough capability and sustainability
to
be
a credible contribution to any coalition”. The cost would be
£100m higher
because of
a greater volume of UORs.
94.
The deployment
and campaign costs would be additional to the costs identified
for
each
option.
43
Minute
DCDS(C) to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 24 May 2002,
‘Iraq’.
16