The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
227.
Mr Scarlett
wrote to Sir David Manning setting out the JIC’s conclusions,
which
included:
“•
regime
tactics were always geared towards urban resistance as well
as
large‑scale
conventional warfare. The regime has taken heart from its
ability,
so far,
to maintain command control and communications, the lack of a
northern
front, and
the propaganda advantages it derives from domestic (controlled)
and
international
media coverage of the war;
•
the regime
has not yet been faced with visible Coalition successes which
would
shake the
foundations of its self-belief. The ‘shock’ of Coalition operations
on the
Iraqis has
been limited. Coalition Forces have deliberately bypassed
population
centres,
leaving the regime in control of urban areas. The regime’s
command,
control and
communications have been more resilient than either it or
the
Coalition
expected. The prospects for an early regime collapse have
therefore
lessened;
•
the Iraqi
population is reacting cautiously in the face of the regime’s
continued
security
presence and its propaganda. The population fears that the
Coalition
will not
follow through on its initial operation and remove Saddam, leaving
it
open to
regime retribution for popular uprisings. The memory of 1991 is
strong
…
•
the defence
of Baghdad may be more determined and professional
than
previously
thought …”
228.
Mr Scarlett
concluded:
“A key
question was when the perception would begin to change that the
regime
was in
control. This could follow major success against a key support
structure
such as the
Republican Guard or breaking the regime’s hold over a major city
such
as Basra
…”
229.
In a statement
to Parliament on 26 March, Mr Hoon reported that:
“After six
days of conflict, the Coalition has made steady progress, following
the
main
outline of our military plan …” 144
230.
Mr Blair
raised the impact of liberating Basra in his discussions
with
President
Bush.
231.
Mr Blair
and Mr Straw met President Bush, Mr Colin Powell, US
Secretary of State,
and Dr Rice
at Camp David from 26 to 27 March.
232.
At dinner on
26 March, Mr Blair and President Bush discussed a range of
issues
including
the need to find ways to rebuild relationships after Iraq, to
re-engage on a
144
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 26 March
2003, column 291.
40