12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
865.
On 24 March,
Dr Roger Hutton, MOD Director Joint Commitments, provided
an
update to
Mr Hoon on discussion of Lt Gen Fry’s paper by the Chiefs
of Staff.830
The
update gave
further detail on how the UK military would support that new
approach in
MND(SE), to
include:
•
the
provision of MTTs at divisional and brigade level (there were four
Iraqi Army
brigades in
MND(SE); it was envisaged that the UK would provide MTTs
for
two of
them and the Australians and Italians would provide one MTT each
for the
other two
brigades);
•
two Short
Term Training Team deployments, one in June and one in
December
to look at
the effectiveness of training; and
•
continued
“partnership” with the UK brigade partnering the
divisional
headquarters
of 10th Division and a coalition battlegroup working with
each
of the
four brigades in the 10th Division.
866.
Dr Hutton
advised that there would be a requirement of only 25 extra
troops
to implement
this approach.
The 10th
Division was the Iraqi Army division in MND(SE) that had been
trained by UK
personnel.
It was established by Maj Gen Riley as reported in his
update on Southern Iraq
on 12
January 2005. He wrote that he had established the 10th Division
alongside HQ
MND(SE) at
the Basra Air Station.831
867.
Gen Jackson
visited Iraq from 17 to 20 April 2005.832
On his return
he reported:
“… military
SSR continues to progress well and the provision of Military
Transition
Teams
(MiTTs) should provide a qualitative boost to ISF performance …
Overall,
GOC MND(SE)
remains confident that his military SSR efforts will be
complete
in Maysan
and Al Muthanna circa October 2005; and in Basra and Dhi Qar
circa
March 2006.”
868.
On the IPS,
Gen Jackson wrote:
“In
contrast to the satisfactory progress with the development of the
Iraqi Army, the
lack of
discernable progress with the IPS is alarming … It could become our
Achilles
heel
because without an effective IPS, not to mention a criminal justice
system –
there can
be no Rule of Law, a pre‑requisite for our eventual military
disengagement.
The scale
and quality of International Police Adviser effort is woeful and
the arrival of
the new
Senior Police Adviser has failed to re‑invigorate IPS development.
Although
theoretically
the military is acting in support of the IPA, we find ourselves de
facto
830
Minute
Hutton to APS/SofS [MOD], 24 March 2005, ‘Iraqi Self‑Reliance and
Strategic Intent’.
831
Report
Riley, 12 January 2005, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq update – 12
January 2005’.
832
Minute CGS
to CDS, 25 April 2005, ‘CGS visit to Op Telic 17‑20 Apr
05’.
253