The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
370.
Mr Campbell
argued that the communications strategy “should be rooted in
where
we think we
will end up which currently looks like a military conflict that
ends in Saddam
falling”.
The major steps and key messages envisaged by Mr Campbell
were:
•
Iraq’s
declaration would be “shown to be false – requires strategy which
…
emphasises
our determination to ensure Saddam Hussein understands … this
is
his last
chance and that we are trying our hardest to make the process work
…
We need to
guard against the sense that we are looking for the process to
fail,
rather than
looking for the process to succeed;”
•
a “UN
discussion” where the tone would be one of “regret that he
[Saddam]
failed to
take the chance” and with the “UK at heart of coalition
building around
key
arguments”;
•
a “Military
build up” which moved from the “current argument that ‘sometimes
the
only way to
avoid conflict is by making it clear willing to use force if
necessary’
to ‘we did
not want war, but Saddam Hussein has rejected the peaceful path
to
disarmament’”;
•
“Military
conflict: This is the last resort. Now we need to get the job
done”; and
•
“Post
conflict: We’re there to help for the long term.”
371.
A “specific
communications plan for the Iraqi people” was being developed
which
would
emphasise Iraq’s territorial integrity and make it clear that “we
are gunning for
Saddam’s
people at the top, not the ‘ordinary’ people”. In
Mr Campbell’s view they would
“actually
prefer a ‘regime change’ message to a more subtle ‘disarmament’
message”.
372.
Mr Campbell
argued that the UK needed a “clear sense of a UK
Government
position
that is our own … not merely an echo” of the US position and
counter the sense
that the UK
was acting for America. The UK had to “communicate better the
threat and
relevance
to the UK”. The UK position “should be that the issue of Iraq/WMD
has to be
addressed,
we worked hard to get [the] UN route … and we’re working hard to
make that
route work.
But Saddam has to understand this is his last chance, and in the
meantime
we carry on
military preparations.”
373.
Mr Campbell
wrote that the US tone was “dismissive” on inspections; the UK
had
to be
deliberative. The UK needed to “set out our own definition of
material breach.
The closest
we have is Jack [Straw]’s statement that ‘material breach means
something
significant:
some behaviour or pattern of behaviour which is serious’”. In
Mr Campbell’s
view, the
media confused “material breach and trigger”.
374.
Other points
made by Mr Campbell were that the UK needed to:
•
“… rebut
the ‘poodle charge’ by answering more clearly the questions –
Why
Iraq? Why
now? And why us?”;
•
“… put over
to the public” that we are in charge of our military
preparations,
separate
from the Americans, “though obviously linked”. The fact that the
US/UK
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