The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
334.
No mention of
a surge of US troops was recorded in the discussion.
335.
After the
press conference that followed the talks, Mr Blair and
President Bush
discussed
next steps on Iraq, including a comprehensive plan covering
reconstruction,
capacity
building, outreach and the role of international community, to be
agreed with
Prime
Minister Maliki.
336.
On 11
December, the Security Council considered quarterly reports on Iraq
by the
UN
Secretary‑General and the MNF‑I.186
Mr Qazi
said that the UN Secretary‑General’s
report
provided “a sober and urgent warning that Iraq stands on the brink
of civil war and
chaos”.
Political transition achievements had not translated into improved
security or
human
rights. Peace initiatives had had no impact on the violence.
Violence seemed out
of control,
provoking widespread concern for Iraq’s future.
337.
The UN
recognised that progress could only be made in the context of
active
regional
and international co‑operation. The International Compact needed a
viable
security
and political environment in which to succeed. While efforts were
under way to
build up
the Iraqi Security Forces, self‑sufficiency would take years. Mr
Qazi concluded
with a
warning that, if security deteriorated further, a major
humanitarian and refugee
catastrophe
might ensue.
338.
The UK Mission
to the United Nations in New York reported to the FCO that
it
had been:
“A
noticeably downbeat presentation from Qazi, echoing the conclusions
in SG
[Secretary‑General]
Annan’s report. In their interventions, most Security
Council
members
(coalition partners excepted) picked up on those aspects of the
report
dealing
with ‘civil war’ … and ‘regional contact group/international
conference’…
predicting
imminent arrival of the former and professing commitment to
support
the latter.
Much store was also set by Maliki’s National Reconciliation Plan
and
the
constitutional review mechanism. But rhetoric and lengthy
interventions aside,
none
appeared to offer new ideas, preferring instead to await any policy
cue from
Washington.”
339.
On 12
December, Mr Hadley told Sir Nigel Sheinwald that the US
Administration
could
accept the need to support Iraqi initiative and ownership,
President Bush was also
considering
a US “bridge force” to help stem the violence in the first part of
2007 as “one
last major
effort to get reconciliation off the ground”.187
No decision
had yet been taken.
186
eGram
55037/06 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 12 December 2006, ‘Iraq:
Security Council
Debate’.
187
Letter
Sheinwald to Hayes, 13 December 2006, ‘Conversation with US
National Security Adviser,
12
December’.
64