3.1 | Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January 2002

• Iraq’s potential to produce WMD at very short notice. Nuclear would be

slightly different … but Iraq’s potential, its capability was very dramatic.”169

366. Asked whether Iraq should have been encompassed in Phase 2, Mr Blair replied:

“Absolutely … I thought we had to deal with all the problems …

“My view was that this was all part of one issue in the end, and that you had to deal

with each and every individual part … that you couldn’t … say: ‘… we will deal with

it sequentially …’ That was not my view.”170

367. Asked whether he had agreed with the advice in the FCO letter of 3 December,

to ratchet up containment and steering away from the idea of supporting uprisings,

let alone military intervention for the purposes of regime change, Mr Blair replied:

“… they were not quite saying that. What they were saying was, ‘… there is a policy

of containment.’… They go on to say: ‘However, it’s not actually stopped him doing

what he is doing’.”171

368. Asked if, in the context of the paper he had sent to President Bush, he was actively

looking at a strategy that would build up in stages to military action against Iraq to deal

with Saddam Hussein, Mr Blair replied:

“… I could see where this was heading the same as everybody else …

“… It was very obvious you had to deal with the issue. There were two ways of

dealing with it: change of heart or change of regime. That was more or less as it

remained throughout.”172

369. Asked if the initiative had been followed up, Mr Blair referred to “a sort of build‑up”,

including an Assessment from the JIC, leading to his meeting with President Bush in

Crawford in April.173 That had evolved at “quite a fast pace … down a track towards

regime change”.

370. Mr Blair added that it was “absolutely clear from the outset” after 9/11 that

President Bush was going to change the regime if Saddam Hussein did not let the

inspectors back into Iraq. The question was whether the US strategy could be “put into

a somewhat different track”, initially an ultimatum and then through the UN.

371. The development of thinking in preparation for Mr Blair’s meeting with President

Bush at Crawford in early April 2002 is addressed in Section 3.2.

169 Public hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 35-36.

170 Public hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 37-38.

171 Public hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 38-39.

172 Public hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 40-41.

173 Public hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 41-42.

373