3.4 | Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September 2002

1. This Section addresses the development of UK policy on Iraq and the UK’s

discussions with the US between the end of July and President Bush’s speech to the

UN General Assembly on 12 September 2002, in which he challenged the UN to act

to address Iraq’s failure to meet the obligations imposed by the Security Council since

Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iraq in August 1990.

2. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessment of Iraq’s chemical and biological

weapons and potential scenarios for their use, of 9 September 2002, is addressed in

Section 4.2. That Section also addresses the FCO briefing on Iraq’s weapons of mass

destruction (WMD) and the production of the Iraq dossier, which was published on

24 September 2002 and debated in both Houses of Parliament.

3. The development of options for a possible UK contribution to a US‑led military

invasion of Iraq is addressed in Section 6.1.

4. By late July 2002, the arrangements for a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq had been

identified as a crucial element for success in the event of regime change in Iraq,

however that occurred. UK planning for that is addressed in Section 6.4.

• In discussions with the US over the summer of 2002, Mr Blair and Mr Straw sought

to persuade the US Administration to secure multilateral support before taking

action on Iraq; and to do so through the UN. They proposed a strategy in which the

first objective was to offer Iraq the opportunity and “last chance” to comply with its

obligations to disarm.

• If Iraq did not take that opportunity and military action was required, the UK was

seeking to establish conditions whereby such action would command multilateral

support and be taken with the authority of the Security Council.

• Mr Blair also decided to publish an explanation of why action was needed to deal with

Iraq; and to recall Parliament to debate the issue.

• The UK made a significant contribution to President Bush’s decision, announced on

12 September, to take the issue of Iraq back to the UN.

• Statements made by China, France and Russia after President Bush’s speech

highlighted the different positions of the five Permanent Members of the Security

Council, in particular about the role of the Council in deciding whether military action

was justified. As a result, the negotiation of resolution 1441 was complex and difficult.

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