4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
•
“… [I]n the
past four or five years the issue of Iraq, weapons inspections
and
what to do
about that regime has come over my desk pretty much week
after
week … [I]t
has been there as an issue the whole time … What we know
now
from the
assessment given by our Joint Intelligence Committee is that the
very
thing that
we feared is the very thing that the Iraqi regime is working
on.”
•
“What has
happened … is that, whether we like it our not, now is the
point
of decision.”
•
“… We have
to be clear that the consequences of saying now to Iraq
that
we are not
going to do anything will be really, really serious.”
•
“… [W]e
have to make the decision, and I do not think we can duck
the
consequences
of that decision.”
824.
Mr Blair
concluded that the threat was not that Saddam Hussein was
going
to launch
an attack on the UK “tomorrow”:
“… the
threat is that within his own region, or outside it given the
missile capability
that he is
trying to develop, he launches an attack that threatens the
stability of that
region and
then the wider world. All the evidence that we have is that if
there is such
a conflict
in that region, we will not be able to stand apart from
it.”
825.
Mr Blair’s
statement about Iraq’s capabilities and intentions included
some
judgements
that were additional to those in the dossier.
826.
Mr Blair’s
categorical statement that the intelligence picture painted by
the
JIC over
the last four years was “extensive, detailed and authoritative”,
was not
an accurate
description of the intelligence underpinning the JIC’s
assessments.
827.
There are a
number of differences between the draft speech and
Mr Blair’s
statement
to the House of Commons where points of detail were added or
changed,
but its
structure and key arguments remained.
828.
In the
statement, Mr Blair emphasised that the information in the
dossier
represented
the view of the JIC.
829.
During a
debate on Iraq on 22 February 2007, Lord Butler said that
Mr Blair’s
statement
to Parliament “that the picture painted by our intelligence
services was
‘extensive,
detailed and authoritative’ … could simply not have been justified
by the
material
that the intelligence community provided to him.”
830.
The draft of
Mr Blair’s statement on 23 September said that the
intelligence
picture was
“extensive and detailed”. The words “and authoritative” were
added
in the final
version; it is not clear who made that change or why.
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