The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
637.
DFID should
have shared that material with other participants in the
AHGI
to inform
cross-government analysis of the state of Iraq and preparations
for
post‑conflict
reconstruction.
638.
Sir Suma
Chakrabarti, DFID Permanent Secretary from 2002 to 2008, told
the
Inquiry
that DFID’s knowledge of Iraq when it began contingency planning in
2002 was
“pretty
scanty” as DFID had not itself implemented humanitarian programmes
in Iraq in
the period
leading up to the invasion, working instead through the UN
agencies, NGOs
and the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).320
639.
Sir Suma also
stated that DFID focused on humanitarian issues
“because
we assumed
that the UN would come in and show leadership on the
post-conflict
reconstruction
and recovery phase” and there was “optimism about the UN being
able
640.
Mr Webb told
the Inquiry that DFID was helpful on humanitarian issues and
was
ready “to
bring in some of their expertise to help with some of the
reconstruction”.322
He stated
that: “the concentration on the humanitarian side, which we had
expected
might go on
for a few months, had probably taken people’s eye a bit off
the
reconstruction
side …”
641.
Mr Blair
agreed draft UK strategic policy objectives for Iraq in early
October.
642.
Those
objectives were published in January 2003.
643.
There is no
indication that Mr Blair sought Ministers’ collective view on
the
strategic
policy objectives between October 2002 and January
2003.
644.
Nor did Mr
Blair seek advice on whether the strategic policy objectives
were
achievable,
and, if so, in what timeframe and at what cost.
645.
The
preparation of the objectives is described in detail in Section
3.5.
646.
On 4 October,
Mr Bowen submitted draft strategic policy objectives for
Iraq,
on which
the Cabinet Office had been working with other departments, to Sir
David
Manning.323
The “prime
objective” was removal of the threat from Iraqi WMD. Other
draft
objectives
included the end state approved by Mr Straw and Mr Hoon in May, to
which a
reference
to “effective and representative government” had been
added:
“As rapidly
as possible, we would like Iraq to become a stable, united and
law-
abiding
state, within its present borders, co-operating with the
international
320
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, page 9.
321
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, pages 61-62.
322
Private
hearing, 23 June 2010, page 59.
323
Minute
Bowen to Manning, 4 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Strategic Policy
Objectives’.
222