12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
been
“evasive about when prosecutions would happen”. Mr Asquith had
encouraged
Mr Al‑Shibli
to push for unannounced inspections to be resumed, despite the
Minister’s
resistance
on the basis that security conditions made it
difficult.
786.
Mr Asquith
considered Mr Al‑Shibli “honest and aware of the problems”,
but that he
had a “weak
political base” and an “inability to confront effectively the
powerful vested
interests
behind the MOI”.
787.
An eGram from
an FCO official in Baghdad on 2 November 2005 reported
that
Gen Casey
had designated 2006 as the “Year of the Police”, recognising that
“a national
police
force that can help enforce the Rule of Law [was] vital to any exit
strategy”.733
788.
The official
wrote that UK police officers were embedded within CPATT
and
providing a
mentor to the Minister of Policing. The UK military had influential
positions in
CPATT and
MNSTC‑I. The official wrote that the US had indicated they wanted
the UK to
“do more”
in discrete areas, such as forensics. They stated that another
possibility was
to embed a
high‑ranking police officer in CPATT to help direct strategic
development but
“the key
remains the quality as well as the quantity of civilian staff we
are able to deploy
to
Iraq”.
789.
Gen Walker
visited Iraq from 22 to 23 November 2005.734
He
stated:
“ISF
development across Iraq is seen to be on track. For most, this
includes the IPS
(by design
the IPS plan delivers more slowly than that for the
Army).”
790.
The MOD
produced two papers for DOP(I) on 20 December.735
The first was
an
update on
progress of Iraqiisation. It stated:
•
development
of the Iraqi Army remained “on track” for the fully funded
and
trained
figure of 130,000 by December 2006;
•
the Iraqi
Police were making an “increasingly significant contribution” but
were
behind the
Iraqi Army in development terms;
•
malign
militia influence, incompetent personnel and weak national control
were
issues that
needed to be addressed by the new government;
•
the
Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) was due to reach full
strength by
May 2006;
and
•
the Iraqi
Navy was a “success story” that risked being undermined by the
failure
of IMOD to
provide a suitable acquisition programme.
733
eGram
17261/05 Baghdad to FCO, 2 November 2005, ‘Iraq: Ministry of the
Interior and Policing’.
734
Minute CDS
to SofS [MOD], 25 November 2005, ‘CDS’s Visit to Iraq 22‑23 Nov
05’.
735 Agenda, 19
December 2005, DOP(I) meeting attaching Paper MOD, [undated],
‘Update on Progress
on
Iraqiisation’ and Paper MOD, [undated], ‘Ensuring the Iraqis are
Ready for a Handover of Security
Responsibility’.
233