The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Iraq had “a
huge infrastructure of deception and concealment designed to
prevent the
inspectors
from doing their job”.
235.
In response to
a request from Mr Iain Duncan Smith, Leader of the Opposition,
for
the
Government to make available any further intelligence relevant to
the security of the
UK or its
citizens, Mr Blair stated:
“We issued
further intelligence over the weekend about the infrastructure
of
concealment.
It is obviously difficult when we publish intelligence reports, but
I hope
that people
have some sense of the integrity of our security services. They are
not
publishing
this, or giving us this information, and making it up. It is the
intelligence
that they
are receiving and we are passing it on to people. In the dossier
that we
published
last year, and again in the material that we put out over the
weekend, it is
very clear
that a vast amount of concealment and deception is going
on.”96
236.
The report,
‘Iraq – Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and
Intimidation’,
stated that
it drew on “a number of sources, including intelligence material”
and showed
how the
Iraqi regime was “constructed to have, and to keep, WMD”, and was
“now
engaged in
a campaign of obstruction” of the UN inspectors.97
237.
The document
was in three parts:
•
Part
One focused on
how Iraq’s security organisations operated “to
conceal”
weapons of
mass destruction;
•
Part
Two provided
“up to date details of Iraq’s network of intelligence
and
security
organisations whose job it is to keep Saddam and his regime in
power,
and to
prevent the international community from disarming Iraq”;
and
•
Part
Three showed “the
effects of the security apparatus on the ordinary
people
of
Iraq”.
238.
In Part One,
the document stated that Iraqi security organisations worked
“together
to conceal
documents equipment and materials” and the regime had:
“…
intensified efforts to hide documents in places where they were
unlikely to
be found,
such as private homes of low-level officials and universities.
There are
prohibited
materials and documents being relocated to agricultural areas and
private
homes or
hidden beneath hospitals and even mosques.
“The
material is being moved constantly, making it difficult to trace or
find without
absolutely
fresh intelligence.
“And those
in whose homes this material is concealed have been warned of
serious
consequences
to them and their families if it is discovered.”
96
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 3
February 2003, columns 23-24.
97
Report
[No.10], January 2003, ‘Iraq – Its Infrastructure of Concealment,
Deception and Intimidation’.
338