6.1 | Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq

planning by default, and Adm Boyce’s advice in Mr Blair’s meeting on 31 October

that US planning was proceeding on the basis that there would not be a UK land

contribution.

954. Mr Hoon’s oral evidence to the Inquiry suggested that the US had given

the impression that, in the absence of a firm decision, it was discounting a UK

contribution.

955. Mr Hoon told the Inquiry that, in October, the UK had:

“… pretty much assumed that the Americans had discounted the prospect of …

[Package 3] and were planning without our involvement, simply because we

had not taken the decisions that were required in the timescale that was at that

stage required.”376

956. Mr Hoon stated:

“… by October … we had had this discussion on several occasions … my

understanding, by the middle of October, was that the Americans were assuming

we wouldn’t be there … on the land [option] … So essentially … what I was really

saying to the Prime Minister was, ‘You have got to decide. You have got to decide

whether we are going to offer this third option and this package of an armoured

division on the land’ … eventually … probably as late as the very end of October,

that decision was then taken.”377

957. Evidence about CENTCOM’s position in documents at the time, including

Adm Boyce’s discussion with Gen Franks on 10 October, Mr Johnson’s advice to

Mr Hoon of 25 October, and Mr Bowen’s report of the Chiefs of Staff discussion on

26 October, indicated that CENTCOM continued to plan on the basis that the UK

might offer a land contribution.

958. The US Administration wanted UK support and bases for political as well as

military reasons.

959. It is not clear what specific information caused Adm Boyce and Mr Hoon to

advise in late October 2002 that the US was planning on the basis there would be

no UK land contribution.

960. The MOD advice and Mr Hoon’s minute of 15 October argued that a combat

role would be time limited, and that it would help the UK avoid a significant and

protracted military involvement in Iraq post‑conflict.

376 Public hearing, 19 January 2010, page 36.

377 Public hearing, 19 January 2010, pages 45‑46.

319