10.3 | Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and stabilisation policy

358. TPUK provided an update for Mr Blair on commercial issues on 10 October.191

The update is described in more detail later in this Section.

359. TPUK advised that the UK’s strategy was:

“… to position UK firms … through the provision of information about contracts,

procurement issues, etc, and to press the US authorities (and the CPA) to ensure

a level playing field on which UK companies can compete.”

360. TPUK advised that the US had made it clear that while they welcomed the

participation of UK companies, there was no “special deal”.

361. The TPUK paper considered oil and gas contracts separately from other

reconstruction contracts. TPUK advised that oil and gas contracts were let by the DoD,

whose procedures were “opaque” and not as open to non-US companies as other

US‑funded contracts.

362. TPUK reported that the DTI’s efforts to understand and influence the CPA’s policy

on oil and gas had been “consistently unsuccessful” until Mr Adams’ arrival in the CPA

Oil Team. That had improved the DTI’s understanding to some extent, although they

believed that Mr Adams’ access to information and decision-making meetings had been

restricted by the CPA.

363. The Annotated Agenda for the 16 October meeting of the AHMGIR stated that the

CPA Oil Team exercised a high degree of control over the Iraqi Ministry of Oil and INOC,

and:

“… behaved with a degree of secrecy towards the US Administration and Coalition

partners, including the UK; the senior UK oil expert in Baghdad [Mr Adams] is

routinely excluded from some meetings.”192

364. In contrast, the UK was building good relationships with senior Iraqi managers in

the Ministry of Oil and INOC.

365. The main issue confronting the Iraqi oil industry was restructuring. The CPA’s plan

was for the INOC Executive Board to include eight Iraqi nationals and eight non-Iraqi

nationals. The UK believed that non-Iraqi nationals should hold only non-executive or

consultancy roles.

366. The AHMGIR agreed that the UK should press for greater access in Washington

and Baghdad, and for INOC to be controlled by Iraqis and funded in a transparent

manner.193

191 Letter Zimmer to Rycroft, 10 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Update on Commercial Issues’ attaching Paper TPUK,

10 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Update on Commercial Issues’.

192 Annotated Agenda, 14 October 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

193 Minutes, 16 October 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

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