The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
13.
Referring to
the report by Dr Hans Blix, the Executive Chairman of the
UN
Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), to the Security
Council
on 27
January, including his comments that Iraq did not appear to have
come to a
genuine
acceptance of the disarmament demanded, and that the discovery of
chemical
rocket
warheads could be the “tip of an iceberg”, Mr Blair
added:
“The
situation therefore could not be clearer. There is a duty on Saddam
to
co‑operate
fully. At present, he is not co-operating fully. Failure to do so
is a material
breach of
resolution 1441. Should Dr Blix continue to report Iraqi
non-co‑operation,
a second
resolution should be passed to confirm such a material breach.
President
Bush and I
agreed that we should seek maximum support for such a
resolution,
provided,
as ever, that seeking such a resolution is a way of resolving the
issue,
not delaying
or avoiding dealing with it at all.”
14.
Mr Blair
also drew attention to the “powerful evidence of the continuing
terrorist
threat”
which had appeared over the past few weeks. Terrorist groups were
“actively
seeking to
use chemical or biological means to cause as much death and injury
and
suffering
as they can”.
15.
Mr Blair
stated that Iraq was not alone in developing weapons of mass
destruction
(WMD) and
repeated his warning that:
“… unless
we take a decisive stand now as an international community, it
is
only a
matter of time before these threats come together. That means
pursuing
international
terrorism across the world in all its forms. It means confronting
nations
defying the
world over weapons of mass destruction. That is why a signal
of
weakness
over Iraq is not only wrong in its own terms. Show weakness now
and
no one will
ever believe us when we try to show strength in future. All our
history,
especially
British history, points to this lesson. No one wants conflict. Even
now,
war could
be avoided if Saddam did what he is supposed to do. But if having
made
a demand
backed up by a threat of force, we fail to enforce that demand, the
result
will not be
peace or security. It will simply be returning to confront the
issue again
at a
later time, with the world less stable, the will of the
international community less
certain and
those repressive states or terrorist groups that would destroy our
way
of life
emboldened and undeterred.”
16.
Mr Blair
concluded that he hoped that conflict with Iraq could be avoided
and that
Saddam
Hussein “can come to his senses, co-operate fully and disarm
peacefully”.
But if
he did not:
“… he must
be disarmed by force. If we have to go down that route, we shall
do
all we can
to minimise the risks to the people of Iraq, and we give an
absolute
undertaking
to protect Iraq’s territorial integrity …
“Saddam’s
weapons of mass destruction and the threats they pose to the world
must
be
confronted. In doing so, this country and our Armed Forces will be
helping the
long-term
peace and security of Britain and the world.”
182