The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
839.
The JIC
Sub-Committee on Iraq/WMD, chaired by Mr Ehrman, who took up
his
appointment
as Chairman of the JIC at the end of August, discussed
Mr Duelfer’s draft
Comprehensive
Report on 17 September.470
840.
The meeting
was also informed that Washington planned to reduce the size of
the
ISG in
Baghdad, culminating in its merger with MNF-I. During the drawdown
period it
could
follow up a number of lines “including reporting on the chemical
laboratory network
and links
with Syria”.
841.
Mr Ehrman
reported to Sir Nigel Sheinwald that the DIS had received five of
the
six
chapters of the draft Comprehensive Report, which would be
considered for factual
accuracy
and intelligence source protection.471
Mr Duelfer
had made it clear he would
not accept
any attempt to alter the judgements in the Report. Mr Ehrman
stated that no
such
attempts were being made.
842.
Mr Ehrman
explained that the JIC was:
“…
preparing a table showing key conclusions set against what the
dossier and
JIC assessments
said before the war … [T]he headline points can be
summarised
as
follows:
a)
Strategic intent
Duelfer
concludes that Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability
after
sanctions
were removed. Though there was no formal written strategy or plan
for
this, the
ISG say they have clear evidence of his intent to do it. Saddam
aspired to
develop a
nuclear capability but intended to focus on ballistic missile and
tactical
CW
capabilities.
Iraq never
intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions … By
mid-2000
elements
within Saddam’s regime boasted that the UN sanctions regime was
slowly
eroding.
b) WMD
capabilities
Duelfer
judges that Iraq’s WMD capability was mostly destroyed in 1991
…
Saddam’s
perceived requirement to bluff about WMD … made it too dangerous
to
reveal this
to the international community …
Duelfer
says that the ISG has not judged conclusively whether or not
Saddam
possessed
WMD in 2003 …
470
Minutes,
17 September 2004, JIC Sub-Committee on Iraq/WMD
meeting.
471
Minute
Ehrman to Sheinwald, 17 September 2004, ‘Iraq Survey Group
(ISG) Report’.
590