12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
956.
In an email on
7 October to senior officials in the Home Office and the
FCO,
CC
Kernaghan said that he was “naturally supportive” of
Sir Ronnie’s appointment to
review the
UK’s policing contribution in Iraq.896
However, he
expressed concern that
there was
an “apparent lack of strategic vision” within the UK Government and
asked
whether
Mr Blair had ever been briefed on his earlier reports,
particularly his first report
dated May
2003 (described earlier in this Section). He highlighted a number
of issues
that he
believed a review of the UK’s strategy on policing in Iraq needed
to take into
account,
including:
•
the level
of resource – finance and personnel – that the UK was willing
to
commit;
•
an assessment
of what influence the UK had with both the Iraqi Government
and
the US in
the context of SSR; and
•
whether the
UK’s interest was limited to MND(SE) or applied to Iraq as a
whole.
957.
On 10 October,
Mr Wheeler produced an update of policing in each of
the
four
MND(SE) provinces.897
He
described both Muthanna and Dhi Qar provinces
as
“conducive to police reform” but highlighted more serious issues in
the other two
provinces.
His comments on Maysan province are dealt with later in this
Section.
“In Basra
the situation is most complex. The security threat is high (we are
in
lock‑down
but are reviewing whether PAT movements might happen under
military
escort).
There is significant IPS/militia affiliation, abuse and
assassinations are
carried out
by those in the Jameat and the Governor and Council have recently
been
encouraging
non co‑operation …”
959.
On 24 October,
Maj Gen Dutton wrote to Maj Gen Wall, setting
out his views and
proposals
for action to improve management of the IPS
programme.898
On the
nature of
the current
problems, he stated:
“The events
of 19 September 2005 in Basra brought the issue into sharp focus
and
to public
attention, but nothing that happened in that incident will have
come as a
surprise to
anyone who had been involved or who had followed the reporting
from
MND (SE)
over a period of many months. The problems associated with the
Jameat
Police
Station: the lack of control and authority of the Basra Chief of
Police and the
problems of
the divided loyalties of many policemen who are controlled (and
indeed
in some
places planted in the Police) by militant factions, was well known
and
reported.
Knowledge of the problem does not of course make the situation any
more
896
Email
Kernaghan to Home Office [junior official], 7 October 2005,
‘Possible assessment of UK
development
of IPS by Sir Ronnie Flanagan’.
897
Telegram
15268/05 Basra to FCO London, 10 October 2005, ‘Update on Reform of
the Iraqi Police
Service in
Southern Iraq’.
898
Letter
Dutton to Wall, 24 October 2005, ‘Policing SE Iraq’.
275