13.2 |
Conclusions: Resources
4.
The Treasury
began considering the potential cost of UK involvement in Iraq
in
June 2002,
and produced the first estimated figure for the cost of military
action in Iraq
(£2.5bn) in
September 2002.
5.
The MOD sent
“some indicative breakdowns” of the cost of military action to
the
Treasury on
11 October1
and
“ball‑park figures” for the cost of military action (up to
£2bn)
to
Mr Blair on 15 October, to inform his decision on whether to
offer a large scale land
6.
Mr Geoff
Hoon, the Defence Secretary, sent a detailed estimate of
contingency
planning
costs (£1.65bn) to Mr Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, in
mid‑December.
A copy of the letter was sent to Mr Blair. That estimate
covered the
cost of
preparing, deploying and retrieving a military force, but not of
any war‑fighting
or post‑conflict
activities.
7.
The MOD
produced its first estimate of military post‑conflict costs in
February 2003,
just one
month before the invasion. It also increased its estimated figure
for the cost of
military
action (to between £2.5bn and £3bn).
8.
The Treasury
produced detailed analyses of the implications of a conflict in
Iraq for
public
expenditure in September and October 2002.
9.
Treasury
officials’ advice to Mr Brown on military cost estimates and
the implications
for public
expenditure was timely and accurate. It repeatedly highlighted the
risk that
the UK
would have to maintain a significant military force in Iraq in the
medium term
and
challenged the MOD’s assertion that the UK could limit its
financial liability for Iraq’s
post‑conflict
security and reconstruction.
10.
The MOD should
have produced detailed estimates of military conflict
and
post‑conflict
costs sooner, in order to inform consideration of options for the
UK’s
engagement.
11.
Both the
Treasury (from September 2002) and the Department for
International
Development
(DFID) (from January 2003) produced detailed and robust analyses
of
potential
humanitarian assistance and reconstruction costs in Iraq. Both
departments
concluded
that the costs could be substantial.
12.
Treasury
officials’ advice to Mr Brown highlighted the risk that the UK
might have to
make a
significant contribution to Iraq’s reconstruction, as a key member
of the Coalition
and in
particular in the absence of UN cover. The UK Government expected
that UN
cover would
be necessary if other international partners were to provide
significant
contributions
to the post‑conflict effort.
1
Minute Nye
to Chancellor, 11 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Decisions
Nearing’.
2
Minute Hoon
to Prime Minister, 15 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK Military Options’
attaching Paper MOD,
14 October
2002, ‘Iraq: UK Contingency Planning’.
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