8 | The
invasion
1.
This Section
addresses the framework for and conduct of UK combat
operations,
specifically:
•
the role of
the UK in the combat phase of the military campaign;
•
transition
to post-conflict operations in Iraq; and
•
the
establishment of the UK’s post-conflict Area of Responsibility
(AOR)
in the South.
2.
The Inquiry
has not addressed the detailed operational and tactical conduct of
the
military
campaign.
3.
A number of
issues which are relevant to this Section are addressed in other
Sections
of the
Report, including:
•
The UK’s
military planning for the invasion is addressed in Sections 6.1 and
6.2,
including
decisions about the forces to be committed, assessments of
Iraq’s
conventional
capabilities, the regime’s intentions, the possible responses of
the
regime and
the Iraqi people to a military invasion, and the legal framework
for
the conduct
of operations.
•
The UK’s
assessment of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons (CBW) and
its
ability to
deploy them, including its ballistic missile capabilities, are
addressed in
Section
4.1.
•
Lord
Goldsmith’s advice on the legal basis for military action is
addressed in
Section
5.
•
The
arrangements made to provide equipment to forces deploying for
operations
in Iraq,
are addressed in Section 6.3.
•
Planning
for post-conflict operations, including the military presence
and
role, which
was described as Phase IV of the campaign plan, is addressed
in
Sections
6.4 and 6.5.
•
The UK
Government’s decision to take military action is described in
Section 3.8.
•
The MOD’s
handling of military personnel issues, including casualties,
is
considered
in Sections 16.1 to 16.4.
•
The search
for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq is addressed
in
Section
4.4.
•
The
evolution of the US/UK non-military relationship, political
developments in
Iraq and
the adoption of resolution 1483 (2003) are addressed in Section
9.1.
3