The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

112.  The Government dossier on Iraq was published on 24 September.37 It was

designed to “make the case” and secure Parliamentary (and public) support for the

Government’s policy that action was urgently required to secure Iraq’s disarmament.

113.  In his statement to Parliament on 24 September and in his answers to subsequent

questions, Mr Blair presented Iraq’s past, current and potential future capabilities as

evidence of the severity of the potential threat from Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.

He said that at some point in the future that threat would become a reality.38

114.  Mr Blair wrote his statement to the House of Commons himself and chose the

arguments to make clear his perception of the threat and why he believed that there

was an “overwhelming” case for action to disarm Iraq.

115.  Addressing the question of why Saddam Hussein had decided in mid‑September,

but not before, to admit the weapons inspectors, Mr Blair stated that the answer was in

the dossier, and it was because:

“... his chemical, biological and nuclear programme is not an historic left‑over from

1998. The inspectors are not needed to clean up the old remains. His weapons

of mass destruction programme is active detailed and growing. The policy of

containment is not working. The weapons of mass destruction programme is not

shut down; it is up and running now.”

116.  Mr Blair posed, and addressed, three questions: “Why Saddam?”; “Why now?”;

and “Why should Britain care?”

117.  On the question “Why Saddam?”, Mr Blair said that two things about Saddam

Hussein stood out: “He had used these weapons in Iraq” and thousands had died, and

he had used them during the war with Iran “in which one million people died”; and the

regime had “no moderate elements to appeal to”.

118.  On the question “Why now?”, Mr Blair stated:

“I agree I cannot say that this month or next, even this year or next, Saddam will

use his weapons. But I can say that if the international community, having made

the call for his disarmament, now, at this moment, at the point of decision, shrugs

its shoulders and walks away, he will draw the conclusion dictators faced with a

weakening will always draw: that the international community will talk but not act,

will use diplomacy but not force. We know, again from our history, that diplomacy

not backed by the threat of force has never worked with dictators and never will.”

37 Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British Government, 24 September 2002.

38 House of Commons, Official Report, 24 September 2002, columns 1‑23.

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